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Foreword 
The study on Energy Policy and Sustainable Energy Transitions has been a special area of 
research for me, as it involved studying past regimes, discourses and policies that developed 
Ontario’s energy sector.  The Green Energy Green Economy Act, 2009 rapidly evolved Ontario’s 
renewable energy and conservation policies.  In less than a decade, Ontario’s energy sector is 
undergoing a new reform in support of a low-carbon energy transition.  In the context of 
studying Ontario’s progress towards a sustainable low-carbon path, it will be important to 
understand the context of the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016 
on the developments in the energy sector.  This understanding will be achieved through a policy 
evaluation of Ontario’s cap and trade program to assess the progress towards a sustainable 
energy transition.  This evaluation will examine the approach that Ontario plans to use to reduce 
emissions significantly with carbon pricing established in the cap and trade program.  An 
evaluation of Ontario’s cap and trade regulation coming into force in 2017 will be a centerpiece 
of my research and an important evaluation of Ontario’s progress towards sustainability. 
With this evaluation, it has strengthened my understanding on the interactions of climate policy 
on the energy sector.  The needs of the future energy system, with consideration of climate 
change, will impact the development of energy policies, energy planning and infrastructure 
development.  This paper relates to my plan of study in many respects:  understanding the 
rationale of emerging provincial climate policy to uncover discourses in the development of the 
policy design (objective 1-1); assessing carbon reduction policy, their impact and the design of 
cap and trade systems (objective 2-2); exploring the potential changes to regulatory frameworks 
to enable achievement of climate policy goals (objective 2-3); understanding the changes to 
energy infrastructure that forms a central part of a sustainable energy transition (objective 3-2); 
and conducting a policy evaluation of the cap and trade program to inform progress on the 
sustainable energy transition (objective 3-3). 
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Abstract 
Using an interdisciplinary framework, this paper evaluates the effectiveness of Ontario’s cap and 
trade regulation to achieve sustained emission reductions.  This framework is shaped by six 
evaluation criteria to assess the program’s effectiveness: (1) comprehensiveness in scope and 
coverage of emissions; (2) distributional fairness in the allocation of allowances; (3) 
effectiveness of the market design; (4) transparency of accommodations and flexibility 
arrangements; (5) measurability of emission reductions; and (6) the program’s integration 
potential with broader political, economic and environmental policy initiatives.   
First, all greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) emissions consistent with the Kyoto Protocol are 
covered using upstream and downstream points of regulation.  The allowance decline cap will be 
sufficient to meet provincial emission targets of 15% by 2020.  Second, based on a mix of 
auctioned allowances and transitional assistance, the analysis indicates that the value of 
allowances distributed can potentially accrue to industries for at least the first compliance period.  
Third, the effectiveness of the program will depend on enforceability, monitoring and oversight 
of the market rules to facilitate price discovery.  There will be transparency in the criteria for 
eligibility of free allowances, circumstances allowing for flexibility arrangements, and the 
reporting of the action plan evaluations every year.  Forth, accommodations and flexibility 
arrangements will be provided to industries to mitigate the risk of carbon leakage and in 
maintaining competitiveness.  Fifth, until the carbon price reaches levels that could prompt 
significant technological progression by industry, the measurability of emission reductions by 
2020 will depend on the implementation of complementary policies set out in the climate change 
action plan to support sustainable reductions in all sectors of the economy.  The measurability of 
emissions will depend on the enforceability of the submission requirement to confirm facility 
and provincial level emission reductions.  Sixth, Ontario’s design of the cap and trade program 
will be aligned with broader policy goals at the provincial and federal levels.   
To inform future program development, key themes are outlined.  Monitor the performance of 
the market rules in creating an efficient, transparent, enforceable and effective market for many 
years to come, as well as the provision for accommodations and flexibility arrangements.  
Enhance the measurability and sustainability of emission reductions by ensuring successful 
implementation of the climate change action plan and assessing the cost-effectiveness of the 
vi 
 
initiatives funded by cap and trade proceeds.  Continue reviewing the implementation of the cap 
and trade program, progress of the climate change action plan, long-term goals and alignment of 
the program with forthcoming federal climate policy. 
 
Keywords: climate change; effectiveness; accommodations; flexibility; measurability; 
sustainability; integration  
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Acronyms and Definitions 
1
 
 
CO2.  Carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion that depend on fuel properties such as 
carbon content, density, heating value and combustion technology.  
 
CH4.  Methane emissions from fuel combustion are technology-dependent.   
 
HFC.  Hydrofluorocarbons are used as alternatives for ozone-depleting substances in 
refrigeration, air conditioning, building insulation, fire extinguishing systems and aerosols. 
GWP.  Global Warming Potential allows for the comparison of greenhouse gases relative to 
their carbon dioxide equivalent.  The GWP referenced in this report is based on a 100-year time 
horizon based on the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC).  
 
NF3.  Nitrogen trifluoride is used in the electronics industry as replacements for PFC and SF6 
including the manufacture of semiconductors, liquid crystal display panels and photovoltaics.  
 
N2O.  Nitrous oxide emissions are generally emitted from industry as a by-product of fossil fuel 
combustion.   
 
PFC.  Perfluorocarbons are used as alternatives for ozone-depleting substances in 
manufacturing semiconductors, refrigerants and solvents in the electronics industry.   
SF6.  Sulphur hexafluoride is a synthetic gas that is used in the electricity sector for insulating 
high-voltage equipment.   
 
  
                                                 
1
  2015 National Inventory Report, Environment and Climate Change Canada, and U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (2016) 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change is one of the most urgent issues we are facing today and in the coming decades 
due to the dangerous risks that global warming can cause on the environment and natural 
ecosystems.  Due to this risk, it has justified collective action from the global community to 
mitigate climate change through participation in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).  Canada has made a major pivot to propose a national carbon price 
with the provinces and has been developing forthcoming climate policy with the U.S. and 
Mexico.  Canada’s international commitment to fight climate change has been strengthened by 
Ontario’s leadership on climate change mitigation, including the closure of coal-fired generation 
and the development of renewable energy and conservation policies supported by the Green 
Energy Green Economy Act, 2009.  Ontario’s commitment to fighting climate change is further 
strengthened by the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016 that 
enables deep decarbonisation.   
2. Background of Climate Policy Context 
2.1  Market-Based Carbon Pricing Options   
Since the 1920s and 1960s, carbon taxes and cap and trade have been introduced as market 
driven policies to internalize the price of carbon in order to mitigate GHG emissions.  Both 
approaches have different risks and implications.  Carbon taxes fix the price of carbon, allowing 
the market to determine the optimal level of emission reductions.  This contrasts with a cap and 
trade system that controls emissions, leaving the market to determine the price.  As a result, 
while there is certainty with the cost of reducing greenhouse gases with carbon taxes, there is 
certainty on the quantity of emissions reduced with a cap and trade program.  Due to the 
diversity of emissions in most economies and different abatements costs for emission sources, 
the conventional approaches of using a  command and control system and performance standards 
have likely not been sufficient, which brought increasing attention to market-based carbon 
pricing options (Aldy and Stavins, 2012). 
In Canada, both a carbon tax and a cap and trade system have been used for the past two 
decades.  A $30 per tonne carbon tax was implemented in British Columbia in 2008.  This was 
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followed by an emissions tax on coal and petroleum coke implemented in Manitoba in 2014.  
Since Alberta’s 2007 Specified Gas Emitters Regulation that placed intensity-based limits on 
industrial emissions, a carbon tax on its large industrial emitters is planned to come into force in 
2017.  Quebec started its cap and trade program earlier in 2013 and joined California’s cap and 
trade program in five joint auctions to date.  Ontario will be administering a joint cap and trade 
program in 2017, with plans to join Quebec and California in a linked cap and trade system in 
the near future.  Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia have aggressive targets in the near and 
long term, while Alberta and Saskatchewan with the most carbon intensive economies will need 
to reverse the emissions growth that came with their booming oil industries and fast-growing 
populations (McCarthy, 2016a).  Ontario, Alberta, Quebec and British Columbia representing 
80% of Canada’s GHG emissions will use some form of broad carbon price to shift the economy 
away from its dependence on fossil fuels (Ibid).   
In a carbon tax system, a levy is charged on each unit of carbon dioxide emitted.  Carbon taxes 
can achieve emissions reductions efficiently as firms optimize carbon reductions such that the 
cost of an incremental emission is equal to the carbon tax (Hearing before the Committee on the 
Budget House of Representative, 2007).  From a climate perspective, the same cumulative 
reductions can occur at a lower cost with a carbon tax that shifts reductions in the year that are 
cheapest to undertake (Hearing before the Committee on the Budget House of Representative, 
2007).  As a result, carbon taxes can encourage cost-effective, market-driven reductions in a 
year.  Carbon taxes can be perceived to double tax the firms for both abatement and tax 
payments to the government (Stavins, 2008) but the fiscal revenues could be used for 
employment or other tax benefits that improve economic growth, thereby creating a double 
dividend (Baranzini et al., 2000; Jaccard, 2006).  From a consumer’s perspective, the carbon 
price for Ontario was estimated to be in the range of $70 per tonne to fund tax reductions, which 
could impose an additional cost of $50 per month on households (Sawyer et al., 2016).  The 
political acceptance of a carbon tax introduces the consideration of alternatives to guide cost-
effective emission reductions, technology choices and behavioural changes to achieve significant 
emission reductions.   
In a cap and trade program, the government sets a cap on emissions to achieve provincial 
emissions targets and divides the cap into allowances.  Program participants buy allowances 
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from the government to cover their expected emissions, while some may require transitional 
assistance.  Through the trading of allowances on the carbon market, it allows the most cost-
effective emission reductions to happen first and minimizes the total cost of attaining an 
emissions target (Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, 2008; 2011).  Firms that reduce their 
emissions sooner will lower their cost of compliance and benefit from making fewer allowance 
purchases over time.  With international trading, it also lowers the costs compared to a domestic 
unlinked system (Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources US Senate, 
1999).  This is confirmed in Ontario as international linking can lower the carbon price from 
$157 to $18 per tonne in 2017 (Sawyer et al., 2016).  A potential drawback with cap and trade 
systems is that government intervention is required in allocating the cap, which can result in 
distributional issues among program participants. 
Although the carbon prices have ranged from $1 US to $130 per tonne 
2
, 85% of global 
emissions priced below $10 per tonne including the European Union Emission Trading Scheme 
(EU-ETS), Chinese pilot trading systems and U.S. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
are considered to be lower than the theoretical prices estimated in models to meet the 2°C 
climate stabilization goal recommended by scientists (EcoFys, 2015).  These findings support the 
fact that cap and trade systems can lead to lower cost compliance to attain an emissions target.  
As well, participating in a cap and trade program has the benefit of enabling harmonization with 
other countries, as more than 35 countries are regulating two-thirds of global emissions with a 
cap and trade program (Stavins, 2008; EcoFys, 2015; Littell and Farnsworth, 2016).  Regardless 
of the method used, revenues from carbon pricing lead to interesting debate on how best to use 
the proceeds.  This may include investing in low-carbon technology and infrastructure projects, 
while reducing income taxes, government debt and providing transitional assistance to industry 
(Canada’s EcoFiscal Commission, 2016).   
2.2  Post-Kyoto and Emerging Context 
Since 1992, the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) by 154 nations led to the agreement in stabilizing emissions to a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with climate change (McCarthy Tétrault LLP, 
                                                 
2
 Carbon taxes have ranged from $1 US per tonne in Mexico and Poland to more than $60 per tonne in Switzerland 
and Finland, and $130 per tonne in Sweden (EcoFys, 2015).  In a cap and trade system, prices have ranged from $5 
US per tonne in New Zealand to $36 per tonne in Tokyo (Ibid).   
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2015).  The UNFCCC came into effect in 1994 and subsequent negotiations led to the signing of 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.  The Kyoto negotiations established market-based mechanisms such 
as an emissions trading program, the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation.
3, 4
   Now, 20 years after Kyoto, the earlier prospect of a global emission trading 
market created national and sub-national trading schemes in the EU-ETS, New Zealand and 
Norway, regional level trading schemes in the RGGI, and joint cap and trade systems in Quebec 
and California in 2014. 
Canada ratified but withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011.  It has instead committed to the 
Copenhagen climate change target of 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 (Canada Emission Trends, 
2014).  Previously, there has been political risk for the federal government to push for carbon 
taxes, as was experienced by the defeat of former Liberal leader Stephen Dion’s carbon tax plan 
in 2008.  The prospect of carbon prices has been politically challenging, but the urgency with 
climate change has convinced Canadians to support mitigation actions (Coulson and Roberton, 
2016).  The 2009 Copenhagen Accord brought countries together to the 21
st
 session of the 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21) in December 2015 urged by the need to 
agree to a plan to address climate change.  This led to the adoption of the Paris Agreement by 
195 countries to partake in initiatives in mitigation, adaptation, technology development and 
transfer, capacity building initiatives, global stocktaking, implementation and compliance.
5
  With 
the emergence of a national carbon price in Canada and forthcoming agreement from the North 
American Climate Summit, it supports the alignment in climate change strategy between all 
levels of government to achieve significant, long-term emission reductions.   
2.3  History of Climate Policy in Ontario 
Since the Green Energy Green Economy Act, 2009, Ontario was the first jurisdiction in North 
America to commit to phasing out coal-fired generation and achieving a conservation first and 
aggressive renewable energy mandate.  Ontario was a member of the Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI) and was interested in pursuing cap and trade with Quebec and California.  Following the 
                                                 
3
 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a market consisting of certified emission reductions undertaken by 
developing countries that could be used as offsets elsewhere.  A portion the proceeds in the CDM were used to 
finance adaptation projects vis-à-vis an Adaptation Fund for developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol.  The 
European Union trading scheme has been one of the largest purchasers of CDM offsets. 
4
 Joint Implementation is similar to the CDM but was created for emission reduction projects in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe (Newell et al., 2013). 
5
 See draft decision on the Adoption of the Paris Agreement. 
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2008 economic crisis, many U.S. states withdrew from the WCI due to the initial economic and 
political costs of unemployment that were experienced in California, but Ontario stayed and 
helped with the development of design principles of the WCI (Klinsky, 2013).  Ontario’s 
participation in the WCI remained politically sensitive in a time when the viability of a 
renewable feed-in-tariff program was debated during the provincial election (Ibid).   
With the election of a new Liberal majority led by Premier Kathleen Wynne in 2013, cap and 
trade was re-introduced as good environmental policy that fuelled a good economy (Ontario, 
2015).  The climate change challenge presented an opportunity to transform the Ontario 
economy and lead to better public transit, more electric vehicles, greener building standards and 
net zero technologies to reduce energy costs (MOECC, 2015b).  In April 2015, Ontario 
announced its intention to join the WCI cap and trade system.  Ontario hosted the Climate 
Summit of the Americas in July 2015 and signed a Pan-American action statement with 23 
signatories.  This covered support for carbon pricing, public reporting, taking action in key 
sectors and committing to meet GHG reduction targets (Ontario, 2015b).  In November 2015, 
Ontario and Quebec signed a Memorandum of Understanding to confirm their intent to link the 
cap and trade programs under the WCI (Town of Richmond Hill, 2016).  By then, Ontario 
released the Cap and Trade Design Options and Climate Change Strategy.  This was followed by 
the release of the draft regulation in February 2016 for public consultation.  The Climate Change 
Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016 received Royal Assent in May 2016.  
2.4  Lessons Learned from Other Jurisdictions 
Past experiences from the EU-ETS and RGGI highlighted the need to manage costs and volatility 
with cost containment measures (Klinsky, 2013).  The price crash in the EU-ETS was caused by 
multiple factors including the 2008 economic recession, lowered electricity demand and reduced 
output.  Due to the reduction in output in the economy, the under-estimation of abatement was 
found to have an equal effect on the fall in carbon prices as the over-allocation of allowances 
(Ellerman and Buchner, 2006).  The EU’s cumulative oversupply led to reduced auction volumes 
and established a stability reserve of surplus allowances to regulate the liquidity of allowances 
(European Commission, 2014).  The combined effect of the economic recession and low natural 
gas prices relative to coal was also experienced in the RGGI, where emission targets are likely 
not binding unless further revised (Aldy and Stavins, 2012).   
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Initially, there was no price floor or banking system to mitigate surplus allowances in the EU-
ETS system.  These provisions were added to the EU-ETS after the price crash to mitigate the 
price fall and disallow the continued surplus of allowances (Newell et al., 2013).  Carbon 
markets today in the EU-ETS, RGGI, Quebec and California include a price floor and ceiling to 
mitigate price variation.  The flexibility of banking and borrowing promotes cost-effective 
reductions, which lowers the costs of compliance (Tatsutani and Pizer, 2008; MOECC, 2015a).  
With a price floor, it prevents prices from dropping below an expected range (Dinan and Spoor, 
2001).  With a price ceiling, it provides certainty on the incremental cost of abatement that can 
avoid larger losses to the firm, in case the reductions were achieved at a much higher cost with 
an increasingly stringent cap (Ibid).  With a price floor and ceiling, this hybrid approach makes 
cap and trade systems a price-based approach to regulate potential price variability (Aldy and 
Stavins, 2012; Jaccard, 2006).   
With allowance banking, it allows for cost flexibility as allowance levels can vary with price 
shocks through temporal flexibility (Newell et al., 2005).  There could be benefits and risks 
associated with banking.  Laboratory experiments found that banking allowances can smooth 
prices across time and increase efficiency (Muller and Mestelman, 1998).  However, as seen in 
Europe, banking can create an incentive to hold onto allowances for hedging or speculation 
purposes based on their future expected values (Neuoff et al., 2012).  As a result, this causes 
allowance prices to rise (Tatsutani and Pizer, 2008).  Over time, as better information on the cost 
of abatement becomes available, banking and borrowing can help carbon prices reflect their 
future discounted value (Murray et al., 2009).  Banking allowances can reduce price volatility 
and allowance surplus and has the benefit of increasing market efficiency. 
After many years of experience with carbon markets post-Kyoto, new trends have emerged.  
First, significantly different carbon prices can cause inter-jurisdictional financial flows between 
countries and varying degrees to which the cap reflects actual emissions (Radu, 2014; Klinsky, 
2013).  Second, there should be greater transparency to allow equal access to information 
(Klinsky, 2013).  Third, there should be comparability when linking to avoid concerns about 
competitiveness and leakage risk that can affect the sustainability of policy actions (Ibid).  These 
could be important considerations for Ontario as it plans to link with Quebec and California in 
the near future. 
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3. Overview of Climate Policy in Ontario 
After the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016 was passed in May 
2016, the MOECC published key policy documents, including the Cap and Trade Program 
Regulation, Allocation Methodology, Reporting Regulation and Guidelines that govern the 
quantification, reporting and verification of greenhouse gas emissions, and the 2016-2020 
climate change action plan.  The climate change legislation, regulation, supporting guidelines 
and action plan collectively shape the foundation of Ontario’s climate policy. 
3.1  Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Act, 2016 
The climate change legislation creates a regulatory and legal foundation for cap and trade in 
Ontario.  The purpose of the Act is three-fold (Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon 
Economy Act, 2016, s. 2):   
1. To reduce greenhouse gases in order to respond to climate change, protect the 
environment and assist Ontarians through the transition to a low-carbon economy; 
2. To enable Ontario to collaborate and coordinate its actions with other jurisdictions to 
ensure efficacy of its regulatory scheme in the context of broader international efforts to 
respond to climate change; and 
3. […] to encourage Ontarians to change their behaviour by influencing their economic 
decisions that directly, and indirectly, contribute to the emission of greenhouse gases.   
The climate change legislation sets the components of Ontario’s climate policy (MOECC, 
2016a): 
 The provincial long-term emission targets are -15% (2020), -37% (2030) and -80% 
(2050) relative to the 1990 baseline;  
 The climate change action plan sets out the actions to modify behaviour and enable 
achievement of greenhouse gas reduction targets;  
 There will be provision for the distribution of allowances, creation of early retirement 
credits, offsets registration, enforcement, and public notices in the cap and trade 
program; 
 Investments and initiatives will be funded by the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Account 
(GGRA) to support emission reductions; and   
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 Reporting and review processes will ensure transparency and accountability in the 
actions taken. 
The legislation sets out the timelines, disclosure of information in the climate change action plan 
and review processes for the initiatives funded by the GGRA.  The climate change action plan 
will be reviewed at least every five years.  To be transparent and accountable, the status of the 
actions funded by the GGRA will be reported at least once every year.  The action plan will at a 
minimum include details on the greenhouse gas reductions by action, the cost per tonne reduced 
and the amount of funding received from the GGRA to initiate the action (supra, s. 7).  Low-
income consumers will be assisted to manage higher home heating costs. 
The GGRA will be a new account established to receive proceeds from the distribution of 
Ontario emission allowances, administrative penalties and fees payable to the Crown under the 
Act (supra, 71).  Authorized expenditures from the GGRA include the costs of administering and 
enforcing the Act and regulations, costs to fund the action plan initiatives and other initiatives 
that are reasonably likely to reduce greenhouse gases, and the costs incurred by the Crown to 
support emission reductions (Ibid).  The Minister will review and evaluate the initiatives before 
they are undertaken (Ibid).  To ensure transparency in the evaluation process, a report will be 
published at least once every year on the evaluations conducted and funded by the GGRA (Ibid).   
In terms of eligible initiatives funded from the GGRA, these include activities in Schedule 1 of 
the Act that informed the climate change action plan (MOECC, 2016a):  
Schedule 1 of the Act  
 
Initiative 1: Energy sources and uses (production of renewable energy)  
 
Initiative 2: Land use and buildings (retrofitting buildings)  
 
Initiative 3: Transportation (alternative and low carbon forms of transportation compared 
to traditional gasoline and diesel vehicles such as electric vehicles)  
 
Initiative 4: Industry (energy conservation programs)  
 
Initiative 5: Agriculture, forestry and natural systems (afforestation initiatives)  
 
Initiative 6: Waste management (organic waste composting systems)  
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Initiative 7: Initiatives that support organizations in developing and delivering 
financing tools, project aggregation and professional services to consumers to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
 
3.2  Cap and Trade Program Regulation (O. Reg. 144/16) 
Ontario’s cap and trade program runs from January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2020 for the first 
compliance period.  The regulation establishes subsequent compliance periods for each three-
year period thereafter.  Facilities that emit greater than 25,000 tonnes of CO2e are mandatory 
participants of the program, if emissions are attributable to activities related to natural gas 
distribution, petroleum product supply, electricity importation or any activity specified in 
Schedule 2 of the Reporting Regulation.  Voluntary participants emitting 10,000 and 25,000 
tonnes of CO2e per year can opt into the program.  Market participants are allowed to trade 
allowances in the carbon market, but do not have a compliance obligation.   
Ontario will use a hybrid approach to regulate emissions upstream and downstream to cover 
combustion and process emissions from capped participants.  To meet the 2020 provincial 
emission targets, the government will issue allowances each year that fall by an average rate of 
4.1% from 2017 to 2020. 
6
  Some of the allowances will be auctioned while the remainder are 
distributed for free.  The facilities that are required to purchase allowances to cover emissions 
include distributors and suppliers of fuels and electricity importers.  Eligible facilities that apply 
for free allowances are those engaged in the production of specified GHG activities in the 
Reporting Regulation.     
To support a well-functioning market, there will be rules on effecting trade transactions, 
timelines to provide notices on auctions and sales, and enforcement provisions.  The cap and 
trade program allows for flexibility in achieving reductions over multiple periods and using 
allowances and credits to cover emissions.  By the end of the compliance period, participants 
demonstrate compliance by submitting the allowances and/or credits purchased to cover the 
emissions produced.   
The cap and trade regulation comes into force on July 1, 2016, but further regulations are 
expected.  The Ontario cap and trade regulation is planned to allow participation of indirect 
                                                 
6
 One allowance is equal to one tonne of CO2e.   
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steam emissions emitting less than 10,000 tonnes of CO2e per year.  The eligibility requirements 
and number of early reduction credits to be issued are yet to be finalized.  Further requirements 
to create, verify and register offsets and the management of allowances for shut-downs, 
bankruptcies or ownership changes will be consulted on.  Complementary regulations on 
administrative monetary penalties for specific contraventions and impact mitigation for First 
Nations will be made separately in 2016.   
3.3  Methodology for Free Allowance Distribution  
The total amount of free allowances distributed is the sum of allowances distributed using five 
approaches, including production adjustments for changes in output.  The methodology for 
distributing free allowances identifies the facilities that are eligible for free allowances and the 
methodology for allocating allowances based on the facility’s combustion and process emissions.  
Allowance distributions will be supported by verified production data to justify the free 
allowance allocations.  The allocation methodology for free allowances will be discussed in 
Section 8.1 of this report. 
3.4  Reporting Regulation and Guideline for Quantification, Reporting and Verification of 
Emissions (O. Reg. 143/16) 
In 2009, Ontario established a reporting regulation (O. Reg. 452/09) and guideline for the 
quantification, reporting and verification of greenhouse gas emissions under the Environmental 
Protection Act.  Amendments were made to lower the reporting threshold to 10,000 tonnes of 
CO2e and require verification on emissions greater than 25,000 tonnes of CO2e per year.  In 
2016, reporting was required for petroleum product producers, natural gas distributors, 
magnesium producers, and equipment used for both electricity and natural gas transmission and 
distribution.  
Under the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, the new Reporting 
Regulation (O. Reg. 143/16) superseded the prior reporting regulation to support the 
implementation of the cap and trade program.  The Reporting Guideline outlines the methods to 
quantify emissions for an activity engaged in by 2017 and the rules for reporting emissions by 
mandatory and voluntary participants.  It describes the contents of GHG reports for facilities 
engaged in specified GHG activities, the rules for verification and continuing duties for 
verification, and the general duties of the verification firms.  The following changes to the 
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Reporting Regulation and Guidelines were made in support of the cap and trade program 
(MOECC, 2016a, 2016b):   
1. Requirement to report production and process related information to support the 
calculations for free allowance allocations;  
2. Reporting requirements for voluntary participants;  
3. Alignment with Quebec on the measurement requirements for emissions to be accurate 
within 5% and for production data to be within 0.1%;  
4. New default emission factors for calculating emissions from electricity imports; and  
5. Greater detail on the reporting of biomass used in a facility.   
These changes represent improvement to the process to ensure greater accuracy in the 
measurement and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions in support of the cap and trade program. 
3.5  Climate Change Action Plan for 2016 to 2020 
Following the release of the climate change legislation in May 2016, the MOECC released the 
climate change action plan in June 2016 to establish the Ontario government’s five-year plan on 
how to invest the cap and trade proceeds.  The purpose of the action plan is to create the 
conditions to provide greater consumer choice, both to consumers and businesses to reduce their 
carbon footprint and accelerate the adoption of low-carbon technologies.  Key areas of the action 
plan include (MOECC, 2016c):  
1. Establishing a green bank to increase access to financing for energy efficient 
technologies;  
2. Electrifying the transportation system by increasing the availability of zero-emission 
vehicles, cleaner trucks and making transit more available; 
3. Reducing emissions from buildings by providing better information to make more 
informed decisions on energy use and making new buildings more energy efficient over 
time; 
4. Making Ontario one of the easiest and most affordable jurisdictions to install or retrofit 
clean energy systems including solar, battery storage, advanced insulation and heat 
pumps, while protecting low-income and vulnerable communities; 
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5. Supporting a carbon market that achieves reductions at the lowest cost, driven by 
businesses and industry making investments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; 
6. Working with First Nations and Metis communities to address climate change and build 
capacity with actions guided by Traditional Ecological Knowledge; 
7. Building on progress by making government operations carbon neutral that include 
government facilities, operations and procurement; and 
8. Ensuring natural, agricultural and forest lands are used efficiently and sustainably to 
enhance the removal and storage of carbon, and enhancing the capture to CO2e from 
waste.   
With anticipated annual cap and trade proceeds of $1.8-1.9 billion totalling a maximum of $8.3 
billion by 2020, the funds are expected to fund 28 climate mitigation actions to achieve 9.8 
million tonnes of GHG emission reductions by 2020.   
4.  Research Design and Methodology 
4.1  Research Question 
Will the Ontario cap and trade regulation achieve sustained emission reductions? 
4.2  Research Design  
The methodology to address this research question involved using a six evaluation criteria 
framework informed by the Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, Canadian Institute of 
Resources Law, U.S. Congressional Budget Office and Resources of the Future: 
1. To what extent will the cap and trade program achieve emission reductions?  On what 
scale?  Will it capture the key emission sources? 
2. To what extent will the allocation of allowances in the cap and trade program produce a 
fair distribution of costs and benefits?  
3. To what extent will the carbon market be efficient, transparent and effective?  Will the 
rules be enforceable?  
4. To what extent will accommodations and flexibility arrangements be transparent?  
5. To what extent will the emission reductions be measurable and sustainable? 
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6. To what extent will the cap and trade program align with political, economic and 
environmental policy considerations?   
 
These questions will inform the progression of the report as follows. 
Scope of Ontario’s Cap and Trade Program (Section 5).  In designing the scope of a cap and 
trade program, policymakers will choose which GHGs to regulate and how to regulate the 
emission sources.  This policy choice determines the sectors that will comply with the program.  
While maximum coverage of emissions is possible, it is often more expensive to meet an 
environmental objective as smaller sources are harder to measure and more expensive to 
regulate.  Section 5 of this report reviews the scope and scale of the emissions coverage in 
Ontario’s cap and trade program. 
Distribution of Benefits and Costs from Allowance Allocations (Section 6).  In designing a 
cap and trade program, policymakers face the challenge of determining how the allowances will 
be allocated, primarily who receives free allowances and who pays for the allowances (Dinan 
and Spoor, 2001).  To assess the extent to which the allowance allocation produces a fair 
distribution of cost and benefits to consumers and industry, Section 6 of this report assesses the 
distributional impacts from the allowance allocations. 
Effectiveness of Market Design (Section 7).  A well-functioning market is a key feature to 
manage price stability while achieving emissions certainty (Murray et al., 2009; Newell et al., 
2005).  To incent behavioural change, it relies on the effectiveness of the market to facilitate 
price discovery that drives appropriate investments to signal the long-run cost of carbon 
abatement (supra, ibid).  Section 7 of this report assesses the effectiveness of market design by 
reviewing whether the market is efficient, transparent, enforceable and effective to support the 
discovery of the carbon price.  
Transparency of Accommodations and Flexibility Arrangements (Section 8).  Being 
transparent with accommodations and flexibility arrangements are critical as it indicates the 
effectiveness of program rules, given the leeway provided to participants that allow them to 
remain in compliance with the program.  For Ontario, it will be important to assess the 
transparency of accommodations and flexibility arrangements permitted in the cap and trade 
program, which will be explored in Section 8 of this report. 
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Measurability of Emissions and Sustainable Impact (Section 9).  The measurement of 
emissions supports the assessment of emission reductions, the cost of abatement and the 
industry’s overall cost of compliance to reduce emissions.  To assess the extent to which the 
emission reductions from the cap and trade program are measurable, Section 9 of this report 
assesses the measurability of emission reductions through a review of the measurement, 
verification and reporting processes.     
Integration with Other Measures (Section 10).  In addition to the design foundations of the 
cap and trade program explored in earlier sections, Section 10 of this report will focus on 
assessing how the Ontario’s climate change action plan forming the vision of the province’s 
climate change strategy will integrate with political, economic and environmental policy 
considerations.   
4.3  Study Methodology 
Analysis of Ontario’s cap and trade regulation will involve a review of government publications 
and policy documents related to the climate change policy, including:  Climate Change 
Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016; Cap and Trade Program Regulation; 
Methodology for Free Allowances Distribution; Reporting Regulation and Guideline for the 
Quantification, Reporting and Verification of Greenhouse Gas Emissions; climate change action 
plan; draft regulation and design options; stakeholder submissions; climate change discussion 
paper; and Quebec and California cap and trade regulations and updates. 
This paper presents an evaluation and independent estimates of the distribution of allowance 
allocations, leakage risk for Ontario’s manufacturing industries, and potential distribution of free 
allowances by NAICS industries.  Data was used from Statistics Canada, Trade Data Online, 
facility data reported under O. Reg. 452/09 (Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting), and 
MOECC and ICF reports.  The impacts of similar policies from the EU-ETS and U.S. in 
literature reviews were used to infer the potential impacts of Ontario’s approach to cap and trade.  
Recommendations will be made to inform future program development. 
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5.  Scope of Ontario’s Cap and Trade Program  
5.1  Scope of  Emissions Coverage 
The cap and trade program will support an economy-wide coverage that regulates 82% of 2020 
emissions (see Table 1).  Mandatory participants include emission sources from natural gas 
distribution, petroleum product supply, electricity importation or any GHG activity in Schedule 2 
of the Reporting Guideline.  The coverage affects 75% of the people in Ontario (Ministry of 
Finance, 2016; MOECC, 2015e).   
Table 1.  Emission Reduction Targets in Ontario 
 
Source:  Data collected from MOECC’s 2014 Climate Change Update Report; carbon price projections from Point 
Carbon at <http://energyinsider.ca/index.php/ontarios-cap-and-trade-some-early-impact-estimates/> 
The cap and trade program will cover the seven greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto 
Protocol.  These are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, sulphur 
hexafluoride, perfluorocarbons and nitrogen trifluoride.  Carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous 
oxide, making up the majority of GHG emissions in the economy, will be covered.  Sectors 
include transportation emissions from passenger, freight and rail (33% of forecast 2020 
emissions), industrial processes and emissions from product use (34% of 2020 emissions), 
emissions from residential, commercial and institutional buildings (18% of 2020 emissions) and 
from electricity generation (3% of 2020 emissions).
 7
  Ontario’s exclusion of emissions is 
consistent with the emissions coverage in Quebec and California.  Ontario’s emissions profile by 
sector and expected emissions growth is displayed below (see Table 2). 
  
                                                 
7
 This is the forecast of emissions without emission reductions by sector to reconcile the figures to the 82% 
emissions coverage under the cap and trade program. 
Anticipated Impacts for Ontario 2020 2030 2050
Ontario's Cap on GHG Emissions (MT) 150 112 35
Coverage of Ontario's Emissions
Emissions Reduction from 1990 levels -15% -37% -80%
Expected Emission Reductions (MT) ~19 >60 >160
Projected Carbon Price ($CAD/tonne) ~$22 ~$95 >$100
82% (2017-2020)
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Table 2.  Ontario’s Emissions Profile by Sector from 1990 to 2030  
 
Sources:  Data collected from emission forecasts in MOECC’s 2014 Climate Change Update Report; 2013 data from 
National Inventory Report 
5.2  Scale of Coverage Through Points of Regulation 
There will be a compliance obligation on mandatory and voluntary sources at the point of 
distribution (upstream approach) and at the point of emission (downstream approach).  In 
Ontario, a hybrid approach will be used:  upstream for natural gas distributors, petroleum product 
supply and electricity importation; and downstream for large final emitters including industry 
and institutions.  Through these points of regulation, both process and combustion emissions are 
covered.  Process emissions come from chemical reactions as part of production processes, 
where the primary purpose of the process is not energy production (MOECC, 2015b; 2015c).  
Combustion emissions come from the burning of fuel for heating and can be reduced through 
energy efficiency or fuel switching (Ibid).  
Natural Gas Distribution 
For natural gas distribution, emissions from Ontario’s natural gas utilities will be regulated 
through the distribution of natural gas to retail customers.  This includes the upstream coverage 
in the distribution process and downstream coverage of the emissions reported between 10,000 
and 25,000 tonnes of CO2e per year from the gas utilities’ residential, commercial and small 
industrial customers.  The cost of purchasing allowances to cover emissions from the distribution 
of natural gas will be recovered from customers as a cost pass-through in rates.  
1990 2013 2017 2020 2030
% change 
(2013-2020)
% change 
(1990-2030)
Transportation 46 61 60 60 57 -2% 24%
Industry 64 47 57 58 60 23% -6%
Buildings 26 32 29 30 34 -6% 29%
Electricity 26 11 4 5 8 -55% -69%
Agriculture 10 10 10 10 9.9 -4% -1%
Waste 6 9 7 7 7 -22% 17%
Total Emissions (MT) 177 171            167           169          176 
2020 Emissions Goal
(-15% of 1990 emissions)
          150 
2030 Emissions Goal 
(-37% of 1990 emissions)
         112 
Expected GHG Reductions             19            64 
Actual Emissions
(Mt CO2e)Sector
Forecast Emissions (Mt CO2e)
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Large final emitters that are customers of natural gas distributors and natural gas fired electricity 
generators emitting more than 25,000 tonnes of CO2e will instead be responsible for their own 
allowance purchases.  The downstream regulation of emissions associated with the use of fuel at 
industries and institutions, including natural gas use for general stationary purposes, will be 
regulated at the point of consumption at the facility (MOECC, 2015c).  
Petroleum Product Supply 
The regulation of petroleum product supply includes persons that supply 200 litres of more of 
petroleum products, such as fuel oil and propane, from a petroleum refinery or is imported into 
Ontario.  Upstream regulation applies when the petroleum product is first placed onto the 
Ontario market, after the petroleum product was moved from petroleum refineries or 
fractionation facilities (O. Reg. 143/16, s. 12).  This ensures that domestic sales or transfers of 
petroleum products from wholesale or retail points in Ontario will capture for GHG emissions 
from fuel distribution in Ontario (MOECC, 2015c).  The cost of carbon upstream in the 
distribution process will result in a fixed charge per litre of gas consumed by all Ontarians. 
Electricity Generation and Importation 
Electricity Generators.  Emissions from domestic electricity generation that use fossil fuels, 
primarily relating to natural gas fired electricity generation in Ontario, will be covered by the 
natural gas distributor.  There is an exception to electricity generating facilities that connect 
directly to an international or inter-provincial natural gas pipeline, which will have the emissions 
regulated at the point of generation.   
Electricity Imports.  An electricity importer is a person authorized by the IESO market rules to 
cause or permit electricity to be conveyed into, through or out of the IESO-controlled grid 
(Electricity Act, 1998, s. 2).  Importers are required to buy allowances at the border (a “first 
jurisdictional deliverer” approach) in an amount that is equal to the estimated emissions from the 
sources of imported power.  Default emission factors were considered from marginal power 
plants within Ontario’s interconnections to estimate the carbon content of electricity imports.  It 
is expected that emission factors will be updated annually from select jurisdictions in Canada and 
the U.S. (IESO, 2016; Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2016).   
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Ontario’s five interconnections include the ISO New England (ISO-NE), New York Independent 
System Operator (NYISO), Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland (PJM), Midcontinent 
Independent System Operator (MISO) and Manitoba. The electricity emission factors will 
depend on the marginal resource used by these jurisdictions during the on-peak and off-peak 
periods.
8
  Higher emissions from fossil-fuel based electricity generation would be produced at 
the margin.  When linkage is considered, how Ontario’s emission factors may align with the 
emission factors applied to electricity imports in Quebec and California will ensure consistent 
treatment of electricity imports in the WCI.  The measurability of emissions from electricity 
imports is discussed in Section 9.2 of this report. 
Electricity Exports.  The default emissions factor does not apply to electricity exports.  Exports 
will pay the market clearing price for electricity without the embedded carbon cost when natural 
gas is on the margin.  This approach is consistent with the approach taken by California, Quebec 
and RGGI (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2016).  Ontario exports could be less competitive over 
time if the emissions exported outside the province are not regulated (IESO, 2016).   
Cogeneration, including Behind the Meter Generation.  Cogeneration facilities produce 
electricity and by-product heat or steam to run an industrial process.  The emissions from 
cogeneration facilities are proposed to be treated consistently with electricity generators whose 
emission allowances would be covered by the fuel distributor.  The exception is when the 
cogeneration facility is connected to an inter-provincial pipeline.  In this case, allowances are 
purchased at the point of generation.  Cogeneration facilities will also be provided free 
allowances to cover its emissions from the combustion of natural gas to generate electricity 
and/or thermal energy (heat or steam). 
Non-Emitting Generators.  Renewable energy generators including solar, wind, hydroelectricity 
and nuclear facilities are not regulated under the cap and trade program.   
Similar to downstream industrial emitters, the emissions from energy-from-waste facilities will 
be covered at the facility.  Energy-from-waste facilities are regulated, but receive free allowances 
to cover emissions in the first compliance period (see Section 8 of this report).  Energy-from-
                                                 
8
 A marginal resource is defined as the next available unit of production required to meet the next unit of demand.  
In the context of an electricity system it is managed in a least cost dispatch approach (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 
2016). 
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waste facilities that use biomass as a source of fuel to produce electricity, heat or other useful 
energy will be regulated under the cap.  Biomass is defined as an organic matter that is 
renewable and derived from a plant, animal or micro-organism or product made out of organic 
matter (O. Reg. 143/16).  Biomass must be agricultural waste, organic waste material, waste 
from food processing, distribution and preparation operations, landfill gas, biodiesel, biofuel or 
biogas (Ibid).  The measurability of biomass production in support of carbon neutrality benefits 
is discussed in Section 9.4.2 of this report.   
Industries and Institutions 
Large final emitters that engage in any of the specified GHG activities
9
 in Schedule 2 of the 
Reporting Regulation will be regulated at the facility.  Both combustion and process emissions 
will be regulated from large final emitters in support of meeting provincial emission reductions.  
Industries and institutions will be provided free allowances to cover their emissions over the first 
compliance period (see Sections 6 and 8 of this report).  The effectiveness of transitional 
assistance provided will depend on the ability of large facilities to engage in significant low-
carbon activities to achieve long-term emission reductions. It is expected that incremental 
reduction opportunities for large final emitters will be timely as industrial emissions could be 
higher than the emissions from the transportation sector by 2030 (see Table 2 above). 
5.3  Treatment of Emissions from Existing and New Facilities 
Absent restriction on the treatment of new facilities in the cap and trade program, it is assumed 
that new entrants that begin operations in January 1, 2016 with annual emissions greater than 
25,000 tonnes of CO2e are mandatory participants of the program.  Starting in 2017, this will 
ensure stringent regulation of carbon emissions from new and existing facilities.  These sources 
will be assessed on the ability to reduce combustion and process emissions significantly based on 
the stringency of the cap decline from 2017 to 2020.  Depending on the eligibility of the GHG 
activities from the industrial activity of the existing or new facility, the emissions from existing 
and new facilities can be covered with free allowances for the first compliance period. 
                                                 
9
 Schedule 2 activities (O. Reg. 143/16) that preclude electricity generation, operation of electricity or natural gas 
equipment, coal storage and general stationary combustion include the following production activities:  adipic acid, 
ammonia, carbonate use, cement, copper and nickel, ferroalloy, glass, HCFC-22 and HFC-23 destruction, hydrogen, 
iron and steel, lead, lime, magnesium, nitric acid, petrochemical, petroleum refining, phosphoric acid, aluminum, 
pulp and paper, refinery fuel, soda ash and zinc. 
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5.4  Stringency of the Cap Decline 
To ensure that reductions are sustained, the cap should be made more stringent through deeper 
emission cuts in order to send a strong price signal to incent technological innovation (Tatsutani 
and Pizer, 2008).  Based on Ontario’s emissions forecast in 2020, an 11% reduction is needed to 
fall from the forecast to achieve 150 Mt in emissions, which is equivalent to a 15% reduction 
from 1990 levels.  According to the Ontario allowance budget, the emission allowances decline 
by an average rate of 4.1% per year by 2020.  The decline factor is sufficient to meet the 2020 
provincial target, as it is limited by the program cap of 124.7 million allowances in 2020 to cover 
82% of the economy’s emissions.  Ontario’s cap includes emissions from the fuel and electricity 
distributors similar to Quebec and California.  In addition, Ontario will cover emissions from 
energy-from-waste facilities that are not included in Quebec’s and California’s cap and trade 
programs (Purdon et al., 2014).   
To support the provincial emissions targets, it is expected the transportation and natural gas 
sectors will be impacted by annual cap declines, while the sector-specific cap for electricity 
generation remains unchanged (Ministry of Finance, 2016).  This recognizes the significant 
reduction of emissions from the closure of coal-fired generation that will contribute a 32.5 MT 
reduction in emissions by 2020 (Ministry of Finance, 2016; MOECC, 2015d).   
5.5  Assessment  
Ontario’s cap and trade program has an economy-wide coverage of emissions in the key sectors 
to ensure cost-effective reductions in the next four years.  From 2017 to 2020, the emissions of 
all the seven GHGs will be regulated, covering 82% of Ontario’s emissions by 2020 that is 
consistent with the emissions coverage with Quebec and California.  The cap decline rate falls at 
an average rate of 4.1% to achieve a 15% emissions reduction by 2020.  Through the upstream 
regulation of fuel distributors for petroleum products, natural gas and electricity, 54% of 
Ontario’s forecast emissions are covered by 2020.  Upstream regulation of fuel distribution is 
expected to enhance the program’s administrative feasibility and implementation.  It has been 
argued that the upstream regulation of emissions has the most leverage on total emissions 
(Bushnell et al., 2014).  Through the downstream approach, 34% of the forecast emissions are 
covered from industrial activity by 2020.  Ontario’s exclusion of smaller sources includes 
agricultural, waste emissions, and aviation and marine fuels.   
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The exclusion of agricultural and waste sectors could be administratively simpler and reduce 
program costs, as emissions from smaller sources could be harder and more expensive to 
measure if regulated under the cap.  Given the broad coverage of emission sources, the overall 
monitoring costs for emissions could potentially be high.  The exclusion of emissions from 
aviation and marine shipping fuels from the provincial cap is consistent with Quebec and 
California.  The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario (ECO) has noted that Ontario’s 
concessions to aviation fuel and its tax exemptions to coloured fuel undermine the intended 
purpose and operation of the cap and trade program (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 
2016).  In response to the ECO’s comments, Ontario has initiated a review of the initiatives 
supporting fossil fuel use in its Climate Change Strategy (Ibid).  Further reductions to supply 
subsidies could also increase the cost-effectiveness of conservation when carbon pricing takes 
effect (Love, 2014). 
To meet the emissions cap each year, upstream regulated sources will pay for the cost of their 
emissions whereas downstream regulated sources are eligible for transitional assistance to cover 
their process and combustion emissions until at least 2020.  For sources that are not regulated 
under the cap, there are future developments in using agriculture, forestry and lands as offsets for 
Ontario’s cap and trade program (MOECC, 2016c).  Although these emission sources are not 
directly capped, these sectors will be funded by cap and trade proceeds to build greater 
productivity for the environment as carbon sinks that provide Ontario specific compliance 
options (Ibid). 
Based on the coverage of emissions, there is a level playing field established for domestic 
electricity generation and imports based on a first jurisdictional delivery approach.  The carbon 
content of imported electricity will be regulated at the border with application of a default 
emissions factor.  The amount of carbon from electricity imports would depend on where the 
imported electricity originates.  The emissions of electricity exports are not subject to the cap and 
trade program, which could affect Ontario’s competitiveness of electricity exports.  On the one 
hand, nuclear refurbishments increase the strategic importance of natural gas as a peaking 
resource, which could increase the carbon intensity of Ontario’s exports.  On the other, the 
generation fleet is becoming cleaner with increasing capacity fueled by renewable energy that 
makes up 50% of the supply mix by 2025.  As a result, there could be potential developments 
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supporting the increased deployment of low-carbon technologies in the energy system, but 
natural gas fired generation is expected to play an important role in  Ontario’s supply mix. 
The emissions from combined heat and power facilities (generating electricity and heat) are 
covered under the cap and trade program, as are facilities generating thermal energy directly (at 
the facility) and indirectly (via steam imports).  Cogeneration facilities that primarily produce 
electricity output, with heat as a by-product, will be eligible to cover emissions using free 
allowances.  The free allowances will allow cogeneration facilities to be competitive with other 
facilities producing heat or steam for production purposes.   
The program’s allowance cap will be sufficient to meet provincial emission targets.  A direct 
implication of participating in the program is the cost to achieve significant emission reductions 
by 2030 and 2050.  In assessing Ontario’s energy use, 76% of homes are heated with natural gas 
(as opposed to 3% in Quebec), 29% of Ontario’s installed electricity capacity relies on natural 
gas (as opposed to 59% in California) and 15% of Ontario electricity generation is fuelled by 
natural gas (as opposed to 59% in California) (ICF International, 2016).  As Ontario has made 
few investments in low-carbon technologies in Ontario to date (The Conference Board of 
Canada, 2016) and started cap and trade at a later time than Quebec and California, Ontario’s 
marginal cost to abate could be higher.  This challenge supports the economic gains to be made 
for Ontario by linking with the WCI to leverage a larger pool of allowances and/or offset credits 
to lower the overall cost of compliance.  For Ontario to develop resilience to climate change, it is 
a good start for the province to be committed to an upstream regulation of fuels to attain the most 
leverage on emission reductions. 
Based on this assessment, there is comprehensive coverage of emissions that supports low-cost 
compliance, fair treatment of emissions in the cap and trade program, and sufficient annual 
declines in the program allowance cap to meet the 2020 emission targets.  In order to enable 
cost-effective emission reductions, this endeavour could be achieved through linkage with 
Quebec and California and the use of complementary policies to support broad emission 
reductions in all sectors of the economy.   
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6.  Distribution of Benefits and Costs from Allowance Allocations 
6.1  Allocation Approaches: Risks and Benefits 
Based on WCI design recommendations, the distribution of allowances is at the discretion of the 
jurisdiction (Western Climate Initiative, 2010).  This introduces the consideration of benefits and 
risks associated with auctioning allowances, as opposed to allocating the allowances for free.  
The allocation of allowances made by policymakers can affect the social cost of the policy and 
create distributional impacts from the allocation of allowances.  
There are reasons to support free allowance distribution.  Free allowances will compensate firms 
with a production subsidy and implicitly lower the marginal cost to abate (Haites, 2003).  It 
provides transitional assistance to Emissions Intensive Trade Exposed (EITE) industries to 
mitigate against the risk of carbon leakage, as has been done in other emissions trading 
programs.  However, the allocation of free allowances will forego revenues that can be recycled 
into additional relief programs or emission reduction initiatives.  Environmental groups have 
raised the concern that the motivation to reduce emissions is delayed with free allowances 
(Wilson and Grochalova, 2016).  Allocating fewer allowances can send a stronger price signal 
and create more demand for low-carbon innovation (Clean Economy Alliance, 2015).  
Auctioning incents the use of low-carbon technologies and rewards firms that can reduce 
emissions (Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, 2007).  The spirit of auctioning aligns with 
the cost causality principle as emitters internalise the externality.  The government also 
eliminates the risks created by distributing free allowances to the EITE industries as there are 
often information asymmetries on how much cost can be passed onto different sectors (Ibid).     
6.2  Distributional Outcome of Allowance Allocations 
Ontario’s cap and trade program will auction 25% of outstanding emission allowances for sale 
and distribute a portion of the allowances for free to reduce the risk of carbon leakage (O. Reg. 
144/16, s. 57).  With a mixed use of auction and free allowances, $1.8-1.9 billion from annual 
allowances is expected to be earned each year, with 60% of the proceeds paid by petroleum 
product suppliers and 40% of the proceeds paid by natural gas distributors (Sawyer, 2015).  A 
maximum of $8.3 billion could be earned at auction (Appendix 6 of this report) consistent with 
the findings in Table 3, whose proceeds are planned to be used in various areas of the economy.  
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Allowances will be distributed for free to large emitters that could potentially cost $0.7-0.9 
billion each year.  The amount of free allowances provided would be distributed to about 100 
industrial emitters.  
Table 3.  Aggregate Distribution of Allowances (Estimated for 2017 to 2020)  
 
 
Source:  O. Reg. 144/16 for allowance caps and expected carbon prices.  Notes: Auctioned revenues are estimated 
based on a carbon price of $18/tonne that increases at a rate of $1.48/tonne each year to $22.50/tonne by 2020.   
These estimates are based on projected emissions that increase linearly between 2017 and 2020.     
 
The distribution of free allowances representing roughly 30% of the total revenues will benefit 
large final emitters.  The extent of the benefits received will depend on many factors including 
the industry’s marginal cost to abate, market structure, or degree of cost pass-through of the 
carbon cost.  The value of allowances accruing to consumers or the industry will be based on the 
implementation of climate change action plan initiatives funded by cap and trade proceeds.   
6.3  Distributional Effects of Free Allowances to Industry 
6.3.1   Benefits to Ontario’s Large Emitters 
Based on the distribution of free allowances, the allocation is assumed to be proportional to the 
emissions intensity of the product, process or activity (Appendix 2 of this report).   Higher shares 
of free allowances will benefit firms under the product-output approach.  Using 2013 facility 
emissions data, preliminary estimates of the portion of distributed allowances show that 90% of 
the large industrial emitters will benefit from allocations made under the product-output 
benchmark and historical allocation approaches (Appendix 3).    
Free allowances will be awarded to individual companies, rather than to the sector that is 
practiced in Quebec’s allocation approach.  For analysis purposes, the following results are 
summarized by sector.  If the benchmark allowances for process and fixed emissions are 
Year
Ontario 
Allowances
Total Revenues:
if 100% auctioned
Auction Revenues 
(estimate)
Percent of Revenues 
Earned at Auction
Cost of Free 
Allowances 
(estimate)
Cost of Allowances 
as Percent of Total
2017        142,332,000  $              2,569,883,333  $           1,849,466,667 72%  $             720,416,667 28%
2018        136,440,000  $              2,665,633,333  $           1,881,546,914 71%  $             784,086,420 29%
2019        130,556,000  $              2,744,093,704  $           1,895,646,173 69%  $             848,447,531 31%
2020        124,668,000  $              2,805,030,000  $           1,891,530,000 67%  $             913,500,000 33%
Total       533,996,000  $           10,784,640,370  $          7,518,189,753 70%  $         3,266,450,617 30%
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combined to approximate total allowances received per tonne of output, assuming an average of 
600,000 tonnes of output was produced
10
, the following results emerge: 
 Hydrogen production receives the most allowances at 9.65 allowances per tonne of 
hydrogen per year (~5.79 million allowances; ~15% of the cost of 2017 free allowances); 
 Iron and steel manufacturing receives 3.1 tonnes for various types of iron11 produced per 
year (~1.85 million allowances; ~5% of the cost of free allowances);  
 Grey cement production receives 0.803 allowances per tonne of cement per year (~0.48 
million allowances; ~1% of the cost of free allowances); 
 It is expected that petroleum refineries that produce oil in Sarnia, Ontario will be eligible 
to receive 0.0047 allowances per Complexity-Weighted Barrel, and beer manufacturers 
will be eligible for 0.007 allowances per hundreds of litres of beer produced. 
Under the historical absolute allocation approach, pulp and paper manufacturing industries will 
receive in total ~0.99 million allowances a year before applying the cap adjustment factor (~3% 
of the cost of free allowances).  General stationary combustion eligible for historical absolute 
allowances receive ~0.09 million allowances a year (~0.22% of the cost).  Additional industries 
eligible for historical emissions include glass production, petrochemical manufacturers, smelting 
and synthetics manufacturing among others.
12
  Due to the declining cap adjustment factor 
between 2017 and 2020, the government has noted that the issuance of free allowances does not 
indicate that these facilities will receive 100% assistance (MOECC, 2016b).  This rationale is 
further explored in the declining allowance cap for certain industries (see Section 8.1.3.3 for 
details).  The analysis above further demonstrates that the distribution of benefits from free 
allowances amongst industries is not all equal.  The intra-distributional inequities between the 
manufacturing industries that receive free allowances are discussed. 
                                                 
10
 This is the average output of 25 facilities categorized in the product output allocation category using 2013 data 
from the facility data reported under O. Reg. 452/09. 
11
 This includes fixed process and combustion emissions for iron products, BOF steel, EAF steel, limestone used, 
coke and dolomite.  
12
 For energy-use allocations applicable to direct/indirect thermal energy production and historical emissions 
intensity allocations, more specific information on the emissions intensity of products or the amount of energy used 
in a process would be needed to generate an accurate estimate.   
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6.3.2  Cost of Mitigating Leakage  
In the event a domestic economic activity relocates to another jurisdiction and produces 
emissions that are identical to what existed at home, there could be lost production that lowers 
the nation’s competitiveness with no net change in GHG emissions (Beale et al., 2015).  If 
emissions can be shifted outside domestic boundaries due to the imposition of carbon pricing 
policies, the notion of carbon leakage undermines the policy’s effectiveness, integrity and 
political attractiveness.   
An estimate of leakage risk for Ontario was assessed to enable comparability of leakage results 
found in other studies.  Table 4 shows the impact of a 1% increase in the electricity price on 
exports (proxy for total “production”) and GDP (proxy for total “consumption” in Ontario).  The 
percentage difference (e.g. production minus consumption) is an indicator of production leakage 
from Ontario.  If electricity prices were increased by 10% over the last ten years, it could imply a 
-1.2% of lost production based on the six industries tested.  This is attributed to industries in pulp 
and paper (-0.6%), chemical (-0.2%), aluminum (-0.15%), cement (-0.1%), glass (-0.07%) and 
iron (-0.06%).  The leakage rate is small, but the analysis reveals relatively higher leakage risk in 
chemicals, basic metals and pulp and paper industries.  The results in this study are consistent 
with EnviroEconomics’ analysis stating that about -1.5% of emissions could be leaked, resulting 
in a fall in GDP by -0.03% in 2020 (Sawyer et al., 2016).  The potential losses to Ontario’s 
manufacturing production could be small in terms of overall lost economic output.   It is 
reasonable to expect a mix of transitional assistance and auction proceeds, as this policy option 
maximizes net GHG reductions after leakage is considered.
13
 
  
                                                 
13
 See “Summary of Impacts Across Policy Alternatives in 2020” in Ontario’s 2016-2020 Climate Change Action 
Plan. 
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Table 4:  Estimated Net Production Impacts as Proxy for Leakage 
 
Sources:  Data from Ontario’s exports (proxy for production) in iron, chemical, paper, aluminum, cement and glass 
industries from 2006-2015 were collected from Trade Data Online; and Ontario’s GDP (proxy for domestic 
consumption) in the above sectors were collected from Table 379-0030, Statistics Canada.  Notes:  See Appendix 4 
of this report for estimation methodology based on the approach used by Aldy and Pizer of Resources of the 
Future.  Net production is a proxy for production leakage (Aldy and Pizer, 2009; Aldy, 2016).  Results are illustrative 
for Ontario due to the extremely small sample size used to illustrate the impacts. 
 
In comparison to the U.S. study by Aldy and Pizer, a $15 per tonne carbon price on U.S. energy-
intensive industries estimated that the cement, glass, aluminum and chemicals industries had 
stronger leakage effects of greater than 1%.  The paper and iron/steel industries had lower 
leakage risks of less than 1%.  The net effect on leakage was modest, as there was only a 0.2% 
decline in net imports (Aldy and Pizer, 2009).  The study also found a 0.4-2.2% decline on 
employment levels (Ibid).   
Canada’s EcoFiscal Commission found that 2-5% of Ontario’s GDP would be exposed to 
competitiveness pressures under a range of carbon prices from $10-100 per tonne (Beale et al., 
2015).  Only a few specific manufacturing sectors representing less than 1% of Ontario’s GDP 
including steel, chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizer and refining demonstrated notable exposure 
to competitiveness pressures (Ibid).  These results are consistent with the fact that significant 
competitiveness and leakage risks have not yet emerged (Newell et al., 2013). 
In a multi-industry cap and trade program, the market power of the industry affects the pass-
through costs to consumers (Haites, 2003; Laing et al., 2013).  As Appendix 5 of this report 
indicates, Ontario’s chemical products have relatively low market power (index of 0.19) 
followed by basic metals and fabricated metal products (index of 0.21).  This contrasts with the 
pulp and paper industry that has higher market power (index of 0.4).   As hydrogen, iron and 
steel products are price takers, they pass on a smaller portion of their marginal costs to 
Production
a.
Consumption
b.
Net production
(a) - (b)
Iron -0.12% -0.06% -0.06% 0% to -0.7%
Chemical -0.3% -0.1% -0.2% -0.2% to -1.2%
Paper -0.4% 0.2% -0.6% -0.1% to -0.6%
Aluminum -0.2% -0.05% -0.15% -0.5% to -1.3%
Cement -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% -0.3% to -1.3%
Glass -0.13% -0.06% -0.07% -0.3% to -0.5%
Ontario's Competitiveness Effects with 10% 
increase in cost of energy (estimated)
Industry
U.S. Competitiveness Effects with 
$15/tonne (Aldy-Pizer, 2015)
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consumers, despite high degrees of exposure to carbon prices.  This shows that some industries 
in Ontario can benefit less from the free allowances received.  Some reasons for the differences 
in the distribution of benefits among manufacturing industries could be due to differences in 
market power, emission intensities, cost structures and demand elasticities (Haites, 2003).   
As the Ecofiscal Commission notes, the interconnectedness between the structural economy and 
impacts on competitiveness with carbon prices supports evidence-based analysis to assess the 
sector-by-sector competitiveness pressures from carbon pricing (Beale et al., 2015).  This could 
be a useful area of analysis, as providing free allowances are a major cost to the policy.  It would 
be important for policymakers to assess how sensitive different sectors are to carbon pricing over 
time and the extent to which transitional assistance would be most helpful to the industries. 
6.4  Distribution Effects of Allowances to Consumers 
6.4.1  Benefits to Consumers 
Depending on how cap and trade proceeds are used, it affects the value of the allowances 
distributed to consumers and private entities (Stavins, n.d.).  In the past, Stavins’ analysis of the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill, 2009) concluded that 20% 
benefits accruing to industry can fully compensate for the equity losses due to the policy’s 
implementation (Ibid).  Based on the division of initiatives undertaken in the Kerry-Lieberman 
Bill, Stavins found that 82% of the benefits from the value of allowances had accrued to 
consumers while the remaining 18% accrued to industry.   
The distribution of the value of allowances can be assessed from projected allocations of GGRA 
funding in the climate change action plan (Appendix 6 of this report).  Based on the projected 
allocation of cap and trade proceeds, it was found that about 80% of Ontario’s cap and trade 
proceeds may benefit consumers.
 14
  This amounts to over $6 billion in the value of the proceeds 
that may accrue to consumers.  These benefits could be realized if the majority of greenhouse 
                                                 
14
 Initiatives benefitting consumers include six of the seven categories mentioned in Schedule 1: investments to 
deploy renewable technology (initiative 1); support for increasing consumer demand in using zero emission fuels 
that enhance land use and reduce building emissions (initiative 2); investments to support increasing consumer 
demand for zero emission vehicles and public transit infrastructure (initiative 3); investments in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in agricultural and waste industries (initiatives 5 and 6); and initiatives that will support 
organizations in developing and delivering financing tools, project aggregation and professional services to 
consumers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (initiative 7).  The benefits distributed to industry include allocations 
to new technologies (carbon capture, sequestration and storage) and changes to processes or inputs into the 
processes to reduce emissions (initiative 4).   
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emission reductions are achieved by 2020, but it may not if the expected cap and trade proceeds 
are not collected in full.
15
  From a revenue perspective, there is risk that the maximum revenues 
from cap and trade may not be earned to realize the benefits from additional greenhouse gas 
reduction activities.  From a distributional fairness perspective, the benefits received by 
consumers who effectively pay for the distributor’s allowances could be lessoned.   
6.4.2  Costs to Consumers 
The direct cost to consumers, owing to the distribution of allowances, is the cost of free 
allowances paid to the industry, amounting to about $3.27 billion for 2017-2020 period (see 
Table 3).  The indirect cost to consumers, as described below, is the immediate cost that 
consumers pay for the cost of allowances used by fuel distributors, amounting to about $7.52 
billion for approximately 4.5 million Ontario households
16
 from 2017 to 2020 that will pay an 
additional $158 per year for the cost of compliance by 2020.  Table 5 below provides estimates 
of the income distribution effects of home heating and gas transportation costs to consumers.   
In 2017, it is estimated that gasoline prices will rise by 4.3 cents/litre and natural gas heating 
costs by 3.3 cents/m
3
 for residential customers based on a carbon price of $18/tonne.
17
  
Assuming 1,400 litres of gasoline and 2,400 m
3
 of natural gas are used by the average household 
in Ontario every year, the cost of carbon that ranges from $18 to $100 per tonne could 
incrementally increase the bill for low-income consumers from 0.5% and 2.5% of after-tax 
income.  For low-income consumers, the total bill impact including incremental carbon costs 
could range between 8% and 10% of after-tax income.  Due to the substantial impacts on low-
income consumers, it supports the need for targeted assistance to low-income families.  This can 
be particularly challenging as residential tenants have been identified to be unable to make 
energy efficiency upgrades, but will pay the price of carbon (Ibid).  This also includes 
exemptions on fuels used on First Nation reserves to mitigate the cost impacts, which will be 
specified through complementary regulation.  
  
                                                 
15
 A discussion of the risk of market illiquidity described in Section 7 of this report, demonstrated that the 
oversupply of allowances contributed to a loss of revenues earned at auction May 2016 joint auction between 
Quebec and California.   
16
 This is 75% of 6 million households in Ontario affected by cap and trade. 
17
 The cost estimates for gasoline and home heating costs were published by the Ministry of Finance in the 2016 
Ontario Budget in March. 
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Table 5.  Cost Impacts to Consumers by Income Bracket (Estimated from 2017 to 2030) 
 
Sources:  Table 203-0022 Survey of Household Spending, by income quintile; Table 405-0002 for sales of fuel used 
for road motor vehicles; Table 405-0004 for motor vehicle registrations; EB-2015-0114 for 2016 natural gas rates 
approved in Toronto.   
 
6.5  Assessment 
Based on the distribution of allowances, this analysis attempts to estimate potential gains and 
losses experienced in the program’s first compliance period.  This analysis was based on the 
quantifiable benefits known at the time related to the distribution of allowances.
18
  Industries are 
expected to benefit significantly in terms of the value of allowances received from the 
allocations.  Based on the policy options assessed by the Ontario government, however, a 
combination of auction and free allowance distribution is expected to mitigate carbon leakage 
and achieve the highest GHG reductions at the lowest cost.  The distributional impacts between 
producers and consumers are summarized as follows.   
For producers, there could be a potential gain of about $4.7 billion received from the distribution 
of allowances.  These benefits could be comprised of the cost of free allowances received and 
portion of cap and trade proceeds accruing to industry.  About 90% of free allowances are 
expected to come from allowances distributed from the production-output benchmark and 
historical allocation approaches.  The EITE industries benefit from free allowances being a 
production subsidy on their operations.  The economy benefits by keeping jobs and investments 
in Ontario.  When carbon leakage is mitigated, it is expected to last for the period in which 
transitional assistance is provided.  In the near term, the costs of the benefits are socialized 
among all consumers.   
                                                 
18
 This analysis does not account for capital investments or mitigation strategies incurred by large emitters, potential 
cost savings from energy retrofit programs funded by action plan initiatives, and the potential employment impacts 
associated with the implementation of the cap and trade program.   
Incremental 
(+$158/year)
Total 
(+$2,760/year)
Incremental 
(+$880/year)
Total 
(+$3,480/year)
Lowest Quintile  $                         34,895 0.5% 7.9% 2.5% 10.0%
Second Quintile  $                         44,155 0.4% 6.2% 2.0% 7.9%
Third Quintile  $                         63,569 0.2% 4.3% 1.4% 5.5%
Fourth Quintile  $                         82,821 0.2% 3.3% 1.1% 4.2%
Highest Quintile  $                       118,729 0.1% 2.3% 0.7% 2.9%
Carbon Price: $18/tonne Carbon Price: $100/tonne
Income Bracket
Total Consumption
(after income taxes)
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Despite the potential benefits received, this analysis has shown that manufacturing industries 
receiving free allowances can experience varying levels of risk exposure to carbon pricing.  This 
justifies higher proportions of allowances to some industries over others.  The basis of free 
allowance allocations will benefit those who are more carbon intensive and have less ability to 
pass on carbon costs to their customers.  In the long term, even after the free allowances are 
phased out, price-taking industries may suffer from the lower level of cost pass-through of 
product costs to customers.  This could support the need to evaluate the sector impacts from 
carbon prices to assess how carbon leakage can be addressed, without the provision of free 
allowances.  Although it remains uncertain when the free allowances will be phased out, price 
taking firms with less pricing power will need to prepare for major changes soon.  This will be 
beneficial for firms to reduce their future costs of compliance without free allowances availed.  It 
could therefore be reasonable to expect that carbon pricing will incentivize competitive 
behaviour in the industry due to varying degrees of cost pass through of the carbon cost to its 
customers.   
For consumers, it is projected that the potential benefits in GHG reductions distributed to 
consumers from the action plan initiatives may be countered by the costs paid to fund free 
allowances to the EITE industries and the cost of allowances purchased by fuel distributors.  
However, as transitional assistance will be phased out over time, the distribution of benefits to 
consumers through the re-investment of cap and trade proceeds is expected to increase, as 
targeted action plan activities will reduce the energy costs for households and businesses.   
Recent events in the May 2016 auction in Quebec and California raise concern on the viability of 
the market to indicate the marginal costs to abate.  This introduces risk to the funding model for 
the action plan to implement initiatives and complementary policies and create benefits to 
consumers.  Further, as many complementary policies have not been implemented, it weakens 
the expectation of meeting provincial targets, unless the emission reductions will be enforced 
through more stringent means (Winfield, 2016).  This places importance on the enforcement of 
the cap and trade program to achieve meaningful and significant reductions.  As more 
information becomes available on the results of the auction and action plan initiatives, it will be 
useful to continue monitoring the costs and benefits associated with the distribution of 
allowances beyond 2020.   
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7. Effectiveness of Market Design 
The effectiveness of the cap and trade system will be influenced by the performance and 
enforcement of the market rules to facilitate discovery of the carbon price.  The carbon price 
should signal the marginal cost of abatement and incent real behavioural change to achieve 
significant emission reductions.  This is a critical outcome as a low carbon price in the EU-ETS 
could not incent long term technological investments (Laing et al., 2013).  Ontario’s market 
design will be assessed for its ability to be efficient, transparent, enforceable and effective.  
7.1  Market Design and Administration 
 
Due to the potential harmonization of Ontario’s cap and trade program with Quebec and 
California, Ontario’s market design framework is consistent with the WCI.  Once linking occurs, 
amendments to the Ontario cap and trade program will pertain to enforcing congruency in the 
market design with Quebec and California.  By using the Compliance Instrument Tracking 
System Service (CITSS) to support the implementation of Ontario’s cap and trade program, the 
following market rules have been established for Ontario: 
 Quarterly auctions with sealed bids of 1,000 lot purchases  
 A minimum (floor) price that is pegged to the Quebec and California auctions, 
increasing with the rate of inflation each year; and maximum (reserve) prices at fixed, 
tiered, prices representing 5% of total allowances auctioned 
 Purchase limits of up to 25% of total allowances sold for capped participants, or 4% of 
total allowances sold for non-capped participants 
 Holding (or banking) limits of no more than 4% of the participant’s allowances for 
current and future vintage allowances 
 Offset credit limited to 8% of a participant’s total compliance obligation each year 
 Same disposition of allowances as WCI that are unsold or exhausted at auction  
 Similar enforcement provisions as WCI at the time of submission to enforce rigidity in 
the compliance process 
In Ontario’s cap and trade program, the Minister administers the program by establishing the 
compliance and holding accounts for capped participants. Participants will use the compliance 
account to track their purchases in meeting compliance obligations and use the holding account 
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to bank current vintage allowances and/or credits for the future.  At the end of the first 
compliance period, the Minister removes the allowances and credits from the participant’s 
accounts.  Capped participants will demonstrate compliance by submitting allowances and/or 
credits that reflect total emissions produced from 2017 to 2020.   
 
Figure 2.  Illustration of Ontario’s Cap and Trade Market 
7.2  Efficiency  
There could be various measures used to make the carbon market efficient.  Such measures 
include imposing purchase restrictions, cost containment measures that smooth out price 
variability, a strategic reserve to add liquidity in the market, and intervention measures during 
the bidding process to enforce the purchase and holding limits.  These are measures used in 
Ontario’s cap and trade program. 
Purchase limit.  Efficiency in the market is controlled by how much each bidder can purchase in 
the market.  To ensure that the carbon market is efficient, restrictions on the purchase limit will 
prevent market dominance by one participant.  Once bidding into the market is permitted for a 
participant, the rules on purchase limits will apply to the compliance and holding accounts.   
In joint auctions in Quebec and California, the measure of the concentration of allowances 
purchased by participants is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  In a past 
auction (November 2014 to August 2015), 100% of allowances auctioned were sold (Appendix 7 
of this report).  The HHI ranged between 478 and 627, indicating that each participant held about 
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5-6% of the allowances in the market.
19
  As the market becomes more efficient, the share of each 
participant’s bid in the market is reduced.  This indicates that a competitive market creates 
efficiency as market outcomes are not controlled by one participant. 
Banking limit.  The banking provision enables temporal flexibility and adds efficiency to the 
market, as it can mitigate potential price shocks if there are expected shortages in the following 
period.  The market rules allow for 4% of the participant’s annual current and future vintages 
allowances and/or credits to be held for future use (Appendix 8 of this report).  To ensure that the 
banking limit is followed, allowances and/or credits that exceed the holding limit can be 
removed and reserved for sale at auction (O. Reg. 144/16, s. 43).   
Strategic reserve.  Starting in 2017, 5% of the total allowances in each compliance year will be 
put into a strategic reserve that are priced at $51.23, $57.63 and $64.04 per tonne, increasing by 
5% each year with the rate of inflation (supra, ss. 55 and 80).    
The strategic reserve adds liquidity to the market by limiting price shocks that could occur in the 
event of an allowance shortage in the market.  Prior to bidding for reserve allowances held for 
sale, the applicant is required to meet certain conditions before bidding into the reserve 
allowances.  This includes not exceeding the holding and purchase limits and the amount of the 
financial assurance. Only capped entities can make purchases from the strategic reserve.   
Based on past results, the amount reserved for sale should be adequate, as less than 5% of 
strategic reserve allowances have been accessed by Quebec and California.  This was estimated 
from the Quebec and California joint auction report from January 2016, as a total of 141.8 
million reserve allowances were recorded out of 2.9 billion allowances and/or credits in all the 
accounts combined. 
Interventions in bidding to increase efficiencies.  There are various points in time where 
additional oversight is exercised during the bidding process to enforce compliance of the 
purchase and holding limits for each participant.   These are important measures to maintain 
efficiency in the market. 
                                                 
19
 If the HHI is controlled by a single participant holding 100% of the allowances in the market, the HHI would be 
10,000. 
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At time of the auction, the minimum price to be bid by each participant will be the higher of the 
allowance prices in Quebec or California on the day of the auction (supra, s. 71).  Prior to 
accepting the bids, there is a screening process to prevent bids that exceed the holding and 
purchase limits, and whose bid value may exceed the value of the financial assurance (supra, ss. 
72 and 74).  There is oversight at the time of bidding to enforce program compliance and 
monitoring of purchases and holding limits to prevent the accumulation of market power by a 
participant.  Further, to prevent the risk of default, the bid value is to be less than the value of the 
financial assurance. 
The acceptance of bids starts at the highest bid price and continues in decreasing order by bid 
price until no more bids remain (supra, s. 75).  This order appears to ensure that the lowest bid 
price will prevail.  Before reserve allowances are available for sale to participants, the auctioned 
allowances in the market must be used up.  In times of an allowance shortage, the remaining 
allowances will be distributed proportionately to the participant’s share of allowances in the 
market. However, the market rules do not indicate explicit mechanisms to deal with allowance 
surpluses. 
With market oversight to enforce purchase and holding rules, it makes the program 
administratively feasible when there are smoother allowance prices over time.  Due to the 
monitoring and oversight activities enforced in the bidding process, it is likely that higher 
program costs will be needed to create efficiencies in the market. 
7.3  Transparency  
Transparency in the market rules will be discussed in terms of the submission requirements, 
participant disclosure requirements, availability of notices and opportunities to appeal.  These 
rules ensure responsible conduct from participants and accountability from the government to 
report on the progress of the auctions. 
Submission requirement. At the end of the first compliance period, only the following 
allowances can be submitted for compliance: Ontario allowances reserved for sale, emission 
allowances with a current or earlier year vintage, and emission allowances distributed free of 
charge (supra, s. 13).  Until linking with Quebec and California is established, only Ontario 
allowances and credits are submitted by capped participants by the end of the first compliance 
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period.  To prevent theft, the submission of allowances and credits will be confirmed by two of 
the participant’s account representatives (supra, s. 15). 
Disclosure of information.  At the time of registration, all registered program participants will 
disclose the identity, corporate structure and ownership of the applicant.  Specifically, ownership 
details include business associations with greater than 20% control.  Related persons are defined 
as having greater than 50% control of the business.  Market participants do not have a 
compliance obligation, but can register by disclosing information in Schedule 1.  Participants 
who are related persons will allot the purchase and holding limits between the persons.   
There will be one primary account representative or designated representative who can perform 
actions on behalf of the participant.  The registrant’s designation of account representatives will 
be declared at the time of registration.  Altogether, the requirement to disclose the relationships 
of the participant will enhance the participant screening process, disclose the potential allotment 
of allowances between related parties, and indicate relationships between the participant and 
account representative(s) who administers the accounts on the participant’s behalf.  
Availability of notices.  Over the course of the year, information on the auction or summary of 
auction sales will be made available to the public (supra, ss. 60 and 64).  Similar to the notices on 
auction results issued for the Quebec and California, the availability of auction results will 
ensure that the bidding process was transparent on market activities. 
Opportunities to appeal.  For decisions or orders related to the conditions of registration, 
cancellation of registration, closing of cap and trade accounts, administrative penalties and 
review of compliance order, the participant can request a hearing by the Environmental Review 
Tribunal (Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, ss. 2 and 60).  
Although the scope of appeal is defined, this process can simplify the adjudicative process and 
create process efficiencies. 
7.4  Market Enforcement 
Ontario’s cap and trade regulation has enforcement provisions to incentivize compliance.  This is 
necessary to ensure that the allowances submitted represent the emissions produced by 2020.   
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Similar to Quebec and California, Ontario participants can be penalized with additional 
allowances to be submitted in an amount equal to three times the shortfall, known (3 to 1 rule).  
If the participant continues to fail to surrender all the allowances used to meet its compliance 
obligation, the obligation is converted to debt (O. Reg. 144/16, s. 20).  The holding account will 
be restricted to transferring allowances or credits to the compliance account.  The account 
representative’s authority to deal with the accounts is further restricted to the compliance account 
(supra, s. 17).  These enforcements ensure that the participant does not submit fewer allowances 
than the amounts reported.  The 3 to 1 rule, account restrictions and compliance penalty are 
expected to incentive compliance and ensure accuracy of the emissions produced.  
Further to these rules, Ontario intends to develop and publish rules on the application of 
administrative monetary penalties in 2016 to deal with non-compliance of the program and 
reporting regulations (MOECC, 2015c; 2016b).  It will be difficult to comment on the 
enforceability of the submission requirement, as the administrative penalties have not been 
finalized.  With the provision of timelines in the program regulation, it can ensure payment of the 
debt to help enforce the submission requirement.   
7.5  Effectiveness 
An important market outcome is the discovery of the carbon price that reflects the marginal cost 
to abate and incents behavioural changes to achieve a low-carbon transition.  Considering the 
socio-economic impacts and damage costs to the environment, potential damages were estimated 
to cost $5 billion a year (Canada, 2011).  For Canada, there are estimates of $100 per tonne by 
2020 and $300 per tonne by 2050 to achieve deep decarbonisation (Canada, 2013).  As 
environmentalists have cautioned, it can be problematic if carbon prices are not high enough to 
incent the immediate deployment of low-carbon technologies (Winfield, 2016).  At the same 
time, the price of $18 per tonne in Ontario is relatively higher than many global economies and 
will continue to rise to indicate higher marginal costs to abate over time.   
This will be a challenge for policymakers to balance the pace of change by instituting higher 
carbon prices today to signal immediate behavioural and technological change from society or 
allowing carbon reductions to be driven cost-effectively.  The extent of a higher carbon price at 
signalling technological change could be tempered by the implementation of complementary 
policies, which may lower carbon prices when fewer allowances are demanded (Canada, 2013; 
38 
 
Newell et al., 2013; Peeters et al., 2013).  The prospect of linking will also attain the emissions 
target at a lowest cost by leveraging a greater pool of allowances and/or credits to be used for 
compliance purposes. 
7.6  Assessment 
Based on the assessment of the efficiency, transparency, enforceable and effectiveness of 
Ontario’s cap and trade program, there is administrative capacity built in the system to support 
an efficient and transparent market.  Ontario’s market design will be guided by a set of 
harmonized rules to enable linking in the WCI.  The use of WCI infrastructure is expected to 
save implementation and transactional costs.  There will be limited flexibility for Ontario to 
change the market design, as any potential changes will need to be reflected in Quebec’s and 
California’s market design.  However, use of shared infrastructure for market operations is a 
necessary path for Ontario to achieve low-cost compliance and linking of its cap and trade 
systems within the WCI. 
Market oversight has been built into the design to enforce the conditions to participate in the 
market.  The market rules will enforce the purchase and holding limits to increase efficiencies 
and compliance with the program.  These are cost containment measures including a price floor, 
price ceiling and strategic reserve to ensure that the market does not fail.  The monitoring and 
oversight of the program to enforce the market rules are expected to result in higher program 
costs.  Through market oversight and transactional efficiencies, it is expected to facilitate price 
discovery that enables low-cost emission reductions.   
Transparency in the market design has been achieved with the disclosure of participant 
information that clarifies business relationships, potential allotment of holding limits and access 
to the accounts.  The market rules will be enforced throughout the bidding process.  Prior to the 
submission of allowances, the risk of fraudulent activity will be mitigated by having the bids 
confirmed by two account representatives.  By the end of the compliance period, participants 
must demonstrate compliance by submitting allowances equal to emissions produced.  The 
consequences could be serious as the EU-ETS’s provincial emission caps were met, but not all 
firms were compliant and surrendered allowances on time (Laing et al., 2013).  In case of a 
shortfall of emission allowances in Ontario, the 3:1 rule, account restrictions and compliance 
penalty will carry through.  Penalties will otherwise apply, if this condition is not met.  For 
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Ontario, instituting specific timelines with the requirement to pay the financial penalties could 
strengthen the enforceability of the submission requirement.  It will be important to review the 
administrative penalties when subsequent regulations become available in 2016.  
With the harmonization of the market with the WCI, Ontario’s allowance price will be aligned 
with the carbon price in Quebec and California.  The price increases by the rate of inflation to 
create consistent a floor price with Quebec and California.  Despite the gradual price increases, 
the interaction of complementary policies can have negating effects of lowering the cost of 
carbon regulation (Canada, 2013).  If lower carbon prices are accelerated with aggressive 
policies towards renewables, it may reduce the reliance on fossil fuels and free up allowances, 
but also dampen the price signal (Newell et al., 2013; Peeters et al., 2013).  Due to potential 
interactions from renewable and other complementary policies that can reduce natural gas usage 
and the demand for allowances, it questions whether the carbon price path needs to rise to very 
high levels to achieve sustained behavioural changes.  Policymakers therefore face the challenge 
of balancing the pace of change by allowing carbon reductions to be driven cost-effectively in 
the marketplace as compared to instituting higher carbon prices to signal immediate behavioural 
changes in the society.   
Evidence from marginal abatement cost curves have shown that a carbon cost of over $100 per 
tonne would be needed for Canada to achieve a 50% emissions reduction (Rose and Wei, 2008).  
The risk of keeping carbon prices lower is the potential that it may dampen the adoption rate of 
new technologies (Scott et al., 2004).  Policy experiences show that the impact of a low carbon 
price in prompting technological change was experienced by the U.S. SO2 trading program, as 
more than half of the sources did not switch to low-sulphur coal when economical (Hahn and 
Stavins, 2011).  The EU-ETS also experienced low carbon prices which stimulated short-term 
investments rather than longer term, high abatement technologies (Laing et al., 2013).  In the 
near term, monitoring the market will be important to ensure that market liquidity facilitates 
price discovery.  With a market-driven carbon price, it is expected that an efficient market leads 
to a carbon price that reflects the marginal cost to abate and the gradual progression of 
meaningful technological changes when it becomes viable to do so.   
In Ontario, the CITSS supports market oversight, compliance verification, the recording of 
transfers and account information in the WCI.  Although there will be limited flexibility on 
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market rules, the use of CITSS can be seen to raise efficiencies for trading activities and lower 
infrastructure costs to support the implementation of the cap and trade program.  The CITSS is 
similar to the U.S. EPA’s Allowance Tracking System used for the Acid Rain Program.  The 
Allowance Tracking System was adopted by the EU-ETS to record allowance transfers used for 
compliance purposes and to ensure that the submission of allowances at the end of the term will 
correspond to the emissions produced.  Decisions about the CITSS are made by the WCI Board 
of Directors with representation from Ontario.   
8.  Transparency of Accommodations and Flexibility Arrangements  
8.1  Accommodations 
Accommodations were first introduced in the U.S. cap and trade program under the Clean Air 
Act in 1990 that distributed free allowances to regulate SO2 emissions.  Following the U.S. SO2 
cap and trade model, the EU-ETS distributed free allocations based on production-based 
emissions (Peeters et al., 2013).  Based on the production-based approach, the estimation of 
emissions without a good measurement of baseline emissions made the EU market prone to an 
over-allocation of allowances (Laing et al., 2013).  Following the 2008 economic recession, the 
oversupply of EU allowances persisted with 77% of the EU firms holding surplus allowances in 
2011 (Ibid).  This led to the price crash and profits for many firms that passed on the costs to 
consumers (Pew, 2011).  The inability of the carbon price to signal investments in low-carbon 
technologies was criticized.  Today, the EU-ETS has evolved its emissions trading program to 
using industry benchmarks (Radu, 2014).  The result of using performance benchmarks has 
reduced free allocations to the EU countries (Lecourt et al., 2013).  As described in Section 2.4 
earlier, there are automatic stability mechanisms in the EU-ETS to ensure an appropriate level of 
supply based on cumulative allowances injected and banked.   
Studies that have examined the impact of different allocation approaches provide insight on the 
implications of the allocation method that Ontario proposes to use.  Output-based allocations 
provide incentives to firms to maintain their current production levels as compared to historical 
allocations (Haites, 2003).  Results show that output-based allocation can reduce leakage 
substantially, which is a benefit to the industries receiving allocations using the production-
output method (Bushnell and Chen, 2012).  While historical allocations are cheaper to maintain, 
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the cost of maintaining production in an output-based allocation approach will be reflected in 
higher allowance prices (Haites, 2003).   
Due to the potential for carbon leakage in EITE industries, Ontario has made provision for the 
distribution of free allowances in the first compliance period.  The determination of transitional 
assistance was based on the emissions intensity and trade exposure of Ontario’s EITE industries 
(Appendix 8 of this report).  The first part of this section assesses the transparency of free 
allowances provided to the EITE sectors.  The second part of this section then assesses the 
flexibility arrangements included in Ontario cap and trade program to meet their compliance 
obligations.  The discussion on early reduction credits and offsets will be limited, as these areas 
were not finalized in the program regulation.    
8.1.1  Eligibility for Free Allowances 
A facility that is a capped participant involved in the GHG activities listed in Schedule 2 of the 
Reporting Regulation is eligible to apply for free allowances.  The established allocation 
methods in the Methodology for Free Allowances Distribution will apply to all eligible 
participants.  The basis of free allowance distributions will be informed by a standard 
measurement and verification process to validate the reported emissions consistent with the 
Reporting Regulation.   Similar to capped participants, voluntary participants can apply for free 
allowances based on verified data.   
8.1.2  Review Process for Distribution of Free Allowances 
The cap and trade regulation outlines a process for applicants to apply for free allowances and 
how these applications will be considered.  By September 1 every year, eligible participants 
submit an application for free allowances, which is certified by a third party, based on the 
specified GHG activities engaged in at the facility (O. Reg. 144/16, s. 86).  The Minister will 
determine the amount of free allowances based on the proposed methodologies (supra, s. 88).  
The Minister may also decline the application, if the information submitted was incorrect or the 
GHG activity has ceased (Ibid).   
8.1.3  Transparency of Allocation Methodology for Free Allowances 
The distribution of free allowances in Ontario follows the approach used in California’s cap and 
trade program.  A facility’s allocation is determined by a formulaic approach which is the 
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product of (a) an industry assistance factor, (b) the base amount of emissions and (c) the cap 
adjustment factor (Methodology for Free Allowances Distribution, Tables 5 and 6).  The total 
amount of free allowances distributed is the total of allocations by method and of the production 
adjustment.  Each component of the allocation methodology is discussed. 
8.1.3.1  Industry Assistance Factor 
All industries receiving free allowances are subject to the same industry assistance factor of 
100% that treats all industries equally in terms of the leakage rate assumed for all sectors.  
However, Ontario’s approach of using a 100% industry assistance factor is consistent with 
California’s approach of providing transitory support to all industries in the initial years of the 
program (Appendix 10 of this report).   
If transitional assistance continues after the first compliance period, the decline in the industry 
assistance factor will be a key indicator to assess the industry’s risk of leakage.  The approach to 
provide transitional assistance should be targeted and evidence-based using data from the firm’s 
experiences in the program.  Once Ontario links with Quebec and California, there should be 
consideration in aligning industry-specific assistance factors based on consistent methods to 
define EITE sectors.  This would create greater comparability in the amount of transitional 
assistance provided and inform the cost of the emission reductions achieved with free 
allowances.    
8.1.3.2  Determination of Base Emissions 
Product-output benchmark allocation (Method A) 
Under the product-output benchmark approach, free allowances are distributed to five industries: 
cement manufacturing, beer production, hydrogen production, iron and steel, and petroleum 
refining.  Base allowances are determined by multiplying the industry’s benchmark emissions for 
the product by that facility’s output.  As a result, the more energy-efficient the facility is, the 
more allowances the facility receives against the benchmark.  The product-output approach 
constitutes the majority of free allowances provided in the program.  The products receiving 
allowances under this approach have also been identified with higher leakage risk (Appendix 9 
of this report).  They include grey cement manufacturing, beer production, hydrogen 
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manufacturing, iron and steel production (liquid iron, BOF steel, EAF steel, coke, limestone and 
dolomite) and petroleum refining.   
There are a significant amount of free allowances distributed with this approach, which totals 
about 60% of the free allowances provided (Appendix 3 of this report).  This also equates to 20% 
of the cost of 2017 allowances or 5% of the 2017 provincial allowance cap.  It continues to be 
important to ensure that the distribution of free allocations is accurate based on appropriate 
benchmarks used for eligible products under this approach.  
Energy-use allocation (Method B) 
Under the energy-use allocation approach, emission allowances are allocated based on the 
amount of fuel used at the facility.  This allocation approach can be generalized for facilities that 
generate useful thermal energy for an industrial process.  Energy use allocations could amount to 
30% of the free allowances provided (Appendix 3 of this report).  By allowing cogeneration 
facilities on-site to receive allowances attributable to both electricity generation and steam 
generation, it removes the disincentive for cogeneration development if electricity generation 
were ineligible (MOECC, 2016b).  It therefore treats combined heat and power facilities that 
produce heat and electricity in the same way as thermal energy generated from a boiler, a third 
party or thermal energy from a cogeneration unit (IESO, 2016).  This change will simplify 
program implementation and compensate those cogeneration facilities that cannot pass on the 
carbon cost to customers.  The allowances for thermal energy imports are determined in Method 
E. 
The allocation of allowances based on fuel input will generate more allowances for facilities that 
are more carbon intensive.  This approach could be perceived to postpone investments in 
facilities that are more fuel intensive, as fuel-based allowances will increase in proportion to the 
amount of fuel used.
 20
  Given these risks, it appears to be reasonable that there was a re-
allocation of industries including pulp and paper products, petrochemical production and steam 
                                                 
20
 Eligible energy inputs are defined as other fuels that are excluded from the fuel inputs qualifying under the 
product-output benchmark approach, historical absolute, direct allocations and historical emission intensity, other 
than a few exceptions permitted for two facilities that produce nitrogen and steel (Methodology for Free Allowances 
Distribution, s. 2.2.2).  Base allocations can be determined estimating the total amount of energy used in a facility 
that had access to natural gas or another fuel, less the amount of electricity transferred to the IESO or to a 
distributor, plus the amount of electricity purchased or generated from the combustion of fuel (supra, s. 2.2.1). 
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supply from the energy use approach to the historical allocation or product-output benchmark 
approaches to encourage energy efficiency. 
Historical allocation (Method C) 
Under the historical allocation approach, emission allowances can be based on historical average 
emissions intensity or absolute emissions.  For historical emissions intensity, the base allowances 
allocated are determined by multiplying the product’s emission intensity by the facility’s output.  
For historical absolute emissions, the amount of free allowances does not change based on output 
produced or energy inputs used.   
Historical allocations are estimated to benefit at least 10 industries or 20 products.  These 
products include base metal smelting, brick-making, carbon black, ethylene, magnesium 
production, mineral wool insulation, lubricants and styrene (Methodology for Free Allowances 
Distribution, Tables 2a, 2b and 3).  Based on estimates of historical absolute emissions, this 
approach could represent about 30% of the free allowances provided, 3% of the cost of 2017 
allowances, and 1% of the provincial allowance cap (Appendix 3 of this report). 
Despite the benefits of the historical allocation,
 
fixating allowances to a certain quota can 
penalize industries that are growing (MOECC, 2015c).  The historical allocation approach can be 
seen to limit emission reduction targets for the next three years based on the emissions produced 
in the past.  The historical approach rewards carbon-intensive industries by matching the 
allowances with higher historical emissions, but penalizes growing industries or industries that 
have taken early actions.  This contrasts with the product-output benchmark approach that 
measures the energy efficiency of firms relative to the emissions standard of the industry 
benchmark.  Historical allocations can ease administrative burdens as there are no annual 
adjustments to the free allocations provided.   
Direct allocation (Method D) 
Under the direct allocation approach, the allocations appear to be made based on the emissions 
reported and verified two years prior to 2015.  Direct allocations are applied to six different 
facilities: combustion emissions at institutions/universities, waste treatment and energy-from-
waste facilities; process emissions at a nitrogen production facility; and fixed process emissions 
45 
 
for a facility producing lime (Methodology for Free Allowances Distribution, Tables 4a to 4c).  
Similar to the historical absolute allocations, direct allocations could reward facilities if the 
allocation levels are high, while penalizing cleaner plants.  Preliminary estimates in this report 
indicate that the direct allocations approach can represent about 2% of the amount of free 
allowances provided. 
Indirect useful thermal energy (Method E) 
The base allowance allocations for imported thermal energy is determined by multiplying the 
imported heat reported by the non-biomass portion of the energy input used to generate thermal 
energy, and the emissions factor of a boiler operating at 80% thermal efficiency.  The eligibility 
requirement for the indirect useful thermal energy approach is that a facility must not have 
received allowances from another allocation method for the same energy source (supra, s. 2.5.3). 
The MOECC proposed that smaller emissions from indirect steam purchases (less than 10,000 
tonnes of CO2e per year) could be eligible to opt-in to maintain a level playing field between 
regulated facilities (MOECC, 2016b).  This appears to be reasonable as broadened emissions 
coverage with indirect steam sources can lower the cost of compliance in the cap and trade 
program.   
8.1.3.3  Applicability of Cap Adjustment Factor  
The inclusion of process emissions provides broader coverage to achieve economy-wide 
reductions, but the cap adjustment factor for process emissions does not decline until at least 
2020.  This approach recognizes the difficulty that facilities face in implementing process 
changes in the next four years.  It buys additional time for firms to prepare for significant 
production changes thereafter.  Generally speaking, however, it could potentially forego the 
opportunity of achieving cheaper emissions reductions in the long run, if technological changes 
could occur earlier in the process.   
Without accounting for biomass use at a facility, the cap adjustment factor for combustion 
emissions will decline by an average rate of 4.57% per year from 2017 to 2020.  This target is as 
stringent as the average cap decline rate to achieve province-wide reductions.  However, if 
biomass is used at a facility, it can reduce the rate of decline for combustion emissions in 
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recognition of the carbon neutrality of biomass.
21
  The cap adjustment decline rate for 
combustion emissions is allowed to vary by facility in proportion to the amount of biomass used.  
In addition, the cap adjustment factor for biomass fuels does not decline under the energy-use 
allocation approach (supra, s. 2.2.3).  This allows for the continued levels of energy usage at 
cogeneration facilities.  Further, the combustion emissions from an institution and energy-from-
waste facility are exempt from a declining cap adjustment factor for at least the first compliance 
period (supra, s. 2.4.2). 
A consequence of this policy change is that it could be harder to compare the reductions in 
combustion emissions between industries, as industries may or may not use biomass.  The cap 
adjustment factor for combustion emissions will vary on a case by case basis.  To assess the 
effectiveness of the cap adjustment factor, it could be beneficial to correlate the emission decline 
rates by industry to the cap adjustment decline rate, and monitor the cost of actions undertaken 
by facilities to achieve emission reductions. 
8.1.4  Reporting of Free Allowances 
To be transparent with the allocation of free allowances, the participants who received free 
allowances and the amount of allowances distributed to each participant will be made public, 
subject to confidentiality constraints (Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 
2016, s. 31).   
8.2  Flexibility Arrangements 
There are provisions in the climate change legislation and program regulation that allow 
participants to have some flexibility in meeting their compliance obligations.  The flexibility 
arrangements include the following: 
 Facilities can be eligible for free allowances under different approaches 
 Provision for allowances due to increases in production  
 Emissions from direct and indirect links  
 Exemptions from holding limit 
                                                 
21
 In the biofuels industry, carbon neutrality (or zero net emissions) is claimed on the basis that the carbon removed 
from biofuel source approximates the amount of carbon released when it is burned. 
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8.2.1  Facilities can be eligible for free allowances under different approaches 
Some facilities with more than one eligible GHG activity may apply for free allowances.  This 
provision is allowed for certain circumstances as defined by regulation.  Two examples are 
described.  First, Terra International’s Courtright Nitrogen Complex is eligible for allowances 
under different approaches for different products produced: (1) the historical emissions intensity 
approach to cover combustion emissions for ammonia and nitric acid produced; (2) the energy-
use approach, if different fuels other than natural gas are used for ammonia and nitric acid 
production; and (3) direct allocations for process emissions in nitric acid manufacturing.  
Second, Imperial Oil and Carmeuse Lime are both eligible for allowances attributable to 
different processes.  Despite the flexibility arrangements provided, it is not expected to be 
overused, as these exceptions are allowed under prescribed circumstances. Given that facilities 
can be eligible for free allowances under different approaches, facilities should maintain a good 
record on the attribution of emissions from different products and processes that receive free 
allowances for the activities.   
8.2.2  Provision for allowances due to increases in production  
Through the production adjustment mechanism, it allows for the updating of allowances based 
on actual emissions produced.  The production adjustment is applicable to allowances distributed 
under the product-output benchmark, energy-use allocation and historical emissions intensity 
approach.  It does not apply to the historical absolute emissions approach.   
The production adjustment will match the current year’s allocation to production that happened 
in the same year.
22
  On the one hand, if the adjustment results in a reduction in emissions, it 
reduces the risk of over-allocation.  On the other, additional allowances granted through the 
production adjustment process will be a future vintage that can be submitted for compliance 
purposes (O. Reg. 144/16, s. 13).  Although future allowances can be accepted in the current 
year, the additional allowances from the projection adjustment simply reflect the emissions 
increase that occurred in the prior year.   
                                                 
22
 Free allowances for 2017 will be allocated based on the past two years of production or energy use data from 
2015.  This was expected as 2016 data will not be available by September 1 every year, which would be the 
application deadline for free allowances (O. Reg. 144/16, s. 86).  Once the 2017 data becomes available in 2018, the 
production adjustment will be calculated by subtracting the allocations using 2015 data from the allocations to be 
made using 2017 data.   
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8.2.3  Emissions from direct and indirect links 
The GHG emissions associated with a person’s prescribed activity can be emitted by the facility 
and include the emissions of a related party, only if two conditions are satisfied: (1) there is a 
direct or indirect link between the person and third party; and (2) there is a direct link between 
the prescribed activity and GHG emissions of the third party (Climate Change Mitigation and 
Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, s. 9).  This provision accommodates affiliates that are directly 
or indirectly associated with the corporate entity, so that all emission reductions can be attributed 
to the corporate entity for the purposes of estimating total emissions and free allowances.   
8.2.4  Exemptions from holding limit 
A registered participant is allowed to hold (or bank) up to 4% of total emission allowances 
and/or credits in a year.  This can include a combination of current vintage allowances, strategic 
reserve allowances and early reduction credits banked for a future period (Appendix 8 of this 
report).  The same rule applies to the holding limit for future vintage allowances.   
There are two exemptions to the holding limit for current vintages.  First, the holding limit can 
increase if the participant’s activities produced emissions that were at least 250,000 tonnes of 
CO2e more than the previous year (O. Reg. 144/16, s. 41).  Second, the holding limit does not 
apply to the free allowances received.  These exemptions are unique to Ontario’s cap and trade 
program and reflect the needs of large industrial facilities that may require flexibility to increase 
production output.  
8.3  Other Accommodations and Flexibility Arrangements 
The Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016 created provision for 
credits and can impose monitoring, reporting and verification on the person who applies for the 
creation of offsets (ss. 34(4) and 35(4) of the Act).  In California, the criteria for using offsets in 
the AB 32 Regulation created by the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 include 
the requirement that actual emissions are credited from activities that would not have otherwise 
occurred (CARB, 2014).
23
  When establishing the criteria in Ontario, it will be important that the 
                                                 
23
 “Real” refers to crediting only actual reductions using conservative quantification methods; “Quantifiable” 
represents accurate and measurable calculation; “Additional” emissions are those that would not have otherwise 
occurred; “Enforceability” of an offset is demonstrated by submitting attestations to the California Air Resources 
Board; “Verifiable” emissions should be documented and transparent; “Permanent” are irreversible reductions or 
mechanisms for 100-year sequestration. 
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credits represent real, quantifiable, additional, enforceable, verifiable and permanent emission 
reductions.   
Early reduction credits.  According to Ontario’s draft regulation, it was proposed that two 
million early reduction credits would be available between 2017 and 2020 (Draft Regulation, 
2016, A.4.1).  Ontario’s approach is similar to Quebec’s rules in providing a one-time allowance 
for these credits.  Ontario’s early reduction credits would be provided for permanent and 
irreversible reductions between 2012 and 2015 compared to a 2009-2011 base year, but would 
not be provided to industries that received free allowances under the product-output benchmark 
approach (supra, A.4.4).  The average eligible emissions and emissions intensity of the facility 
each year must be lower than the reference period (supra, A.4.5).  Based on these rules, there will 
not be over-compensation to firms receiving free allowances that increase with production.  
Early reduction credits will truly be useful for facilities that have a stringent target based on 
earlier action.   
Offsets.  The WCI rules allow offsets to cover no more than 49% of a facility’s total emissions.  
Both Quebec and California use ozone depleting substances as common offset projects.  In 
addition, Quebec’s offsets include methane capture projects from manure storage facilities and 
waste disposal sites.  California’s offsets include projects in urban forests, livestock substances, 
rice cultivation and mine methane capture.  Among the offset programs, there are different buyer 
liability rules whereby California’s purchasing entities are responsible for the credibility of the 
offset.  Quebec’s offset registry system includes an Environmental Integrity Account that 
includes a buffer of additional offsets in case some offsets are less credible (Purdon et al., 2014).   
California is considering additional principles on environmental and social safeguards from the 
Cancun Agreement (UNFCCC COP 16) to strengthen its existing offset protocols.  
Environmental safeguards are standards, principles or criteria included in the design and 
implementation of a sector-based crediting program to protect the environment and the rights of 
individuals and communities (California Air Resources Board, 2016).  Including environmental 
safeguards in the development of offset protocols and mitigation against environmental 
degradation can prevent conversion of biodiversity and ecosystem (Ibid).  Social safeguards can 
ensure the sharing of program benefits from the use of the offset (such as forests) by developers, 
government and communities to the local peoples who have traditionally used the lands.   
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Through safeguards, equitable benefits-sharing could be achieved by providing tenure rights to 
the local peoples, improving stakeholder participation and apportioning benefits to the local 
peoples (Ibid).  Given the potential linkage with Quebec and California, Ontario could consider 
harmonized protocols and stakeholder engagement in the development of its offsets protocols.  
This can ensure standardization in the baseline of offsets, comparability of offsets and 
acceptability of projects in all jurisdictions.  This further supports greater integration of a 
common offset protocol and an offset registry system within the WCI.   
8.4  Assessment 
Based on this assessment, large industrial facilities will be receiving accommodations and have 
flexibility within the market rules to maintain its production needs while complying with the cap 
and trade program.  Although Ontario’s approach to allocate free allowances is transitory, it is 
not known with certainty by when the free allowances will be phased out.  Given this context, it 
creates the need to understand the benefits and trade-offs with accommodations and flexibility 
arrangements provided to participants of the cap and trade program.  A key goal for 
policymakers is to ensure that industries are accountable for the cost of their emissions provided 
through free allowances.   
The allocation methods for free allowances cover a broad range of eligible products and 
processes in the manufacturing industries.  The distribution of free allowances will be based on 
verified data from existing and new facilities.  For the first compliance period, there is a 100% 
industry assistance factor, treating all industries equally to mitigate carbon leakage.  This 
approach is consistent with the practice used in California for the initial years of its cap and trade 
program.  In the future, it may be beneficial to consider alignment of industry assistance factors 
within the WCI using consistent methods to define the EITE sectors.  This could ensure greater 
comparability in the amount of transitional assistance provided and the amount of emissions 
reduced in the jurisdictions.    
In Ontario, process emissions are not required to be reduced by all facilities over the first 
compliance period.  This recognizes the significant challenges that large industrial firms face in 
reducing process emissions.  This benefits capital-intensive firms by mitigating the risk of 
leakage and avoiding uneconomic investments by 2017.  There could be potential risk of 
delaying low-carbon investments until 2020, but the use of multi-compliance periods in a cap 
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and trade program enables flexibility to reduce emissions in the year it is most cost-effective to 
do so.  For the facilities that have reduced emissions in the past, they could be eligible for early 
reduction credits in recognition of the investments undertaken in the past five years to reduce 
emissions permanently.  The use of early reduction credits would not double penalize the 
facilities with more stringent targets caused by earlier action.  
The cap adjustment factor for combustion emissions declines at an average rate of 4.57% per 
year, with exception to institutions and energy-from-waste facilities.  With the consideration of 
biomass, the cap adjustment factor affecting the rate of decline for combustion emissions is 
relaxed.
24
  This recognizes the carbon-neutrality of biomass by rewarding industries with more 
allowances that use biomass at the facility.  If transitional assistance continues after 2020, the 
industry decline rates for process and combustion should align with the provincial allowance cap 
decline to achieve sustained emission reductions.   
The cap adjustment factors, with the consideration of biomass, will make it harder to compare 
the decline rates for combustion emissions in different sectors.  Consequently, it may be 
beneficial to monitor the rates of emission decline by industry and GHG activity to identify 
where the reductions are occurring and the cost of emission reductions by facility.   
As the EcoFiscal Commission stated, there could be a small degree of leakage due to carbon 
pricing in Ontario.  This is consistent with the findings in Section 6.3.2 of this report.  
Nevertheless, the extent of accommodations provided to Ontario’s industries can mitigate the 
potential risk of leakage, which enhances the effectiveness of the policy during this transitional 
period.  As noted, the consideration of targeted approaches to address leakage could be useful to 
inform the extent of transitional assistance provided.   
Based on the allocation approaches for free allowances, it is likely that energy-use allocations 
will allow for continued levels of energy use.  Industries that engage in energy efficiency are 
penalized by receiving fewer free allowances under the energy-use allocation.  This resulted in a 
policy change requiring certain industries to increase energy efficiency by having free 
allowances allocated based on historical emissions or product-output benchmark approaches.  
                                                 
24
 A potential concern with the carbon balances of biomass may raise debates on its carbon neutrality.  This is 
discussed in Section 9.4.2 of this report. 
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The basis of allocations will be determined on past emissions or industry standard.  Going 
forward, industries are anticipated to be capable of reducing emissions much more significantly 
relative to the baseline, without transitional assistance.   
Based on the flexibility arrangements made under the program’s first compliance period, a broad 
range of options are available to accommodate exceptional situations.  A few were explored 
earlier, but the provision related to exemptions to the holding (or banking) limit is discussed 
below.  Under the circumstance where there are significant increases in production of more than 
250,000 tonnes of CO2e a year, the participant’s holding limit on allowances and/or offsets of up 
to 4% a year is withheld.  Additional free allowances will be provided for the increase in 
emissions and the production adjustment will also apply.  With the production adjustment 
provided to participants in the following year, it creates the possibility that future vintage 
allowances, related to the past year’s emissions increase, can be submitted for compliance 
purposes in the current year.  To ensure accuracy in the measurement of reductions in the current 
period, any future vintage allowance related to the production adjustment should not be used for 
other purposes.  The accommodations to industry participants create the need to evaluate the 
performance of the flexibility arrangements to inform future program development.   
In the context of meeting provincial emissions targets, it is clear that significant reductions will 
need to occur in the industry to meet long-term goals, even with some degree of transitional 
assistance to achieve more cost-effective reductions.  As forecast emissions in the industry will 
be 20% higher in 2020 from 2013 levels (Section 5 of this report), it suggests the need for some 
flexibility in the program rules to create more time for more significant changes to occur after 
2020.  For businesses, a challenge will be securing financing to engage in more expensive 
mitigation options, while finding incremental savings opportunities with energy efficiency 
programs to reduce combustion related emissions cost-effectively in the short-term.  This 
emphasizes the significance of re-investing cap and trade proceeds to help fund these 
opportunities.  Given the cost of transitional assistance provided to large industrial facilities, 
accommodations should be transitory, as planned, and be provided to facilities in the interim to 
mitigate leakage and other risks.  It will continue to be a challenge for policymakers to balance 
the costs and extent of accommodations and flexibility arrangements provided, while 
encouraging significant behavioural change through the industry’s participation in the program.  
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In the future, it may be useful to explore the impact of flexibility arrangements on the pace of 
change and stringency of the emissions cap. 
9. Measurability of Emissions and Impact 
Measurable emissions are critical to informing program coverage, the rate of cap decline and 
distribution of free allowances.  The measurability of emissions should be quantifiable, 
reportable and verifiable.  This enables accurate measurement of the baseline to benchmark 
progress and assesses the potential to meet targets.  This section will assess the measurability of 
emissions by reviewing the measurement, reporting and verification processes.  The impact of 
emission reductions from a societal level is further assessed based on the potential emission 
reduction impacts achieved through the climate change action plan activities.   
9.1  Measurement of Emissions  
To support the implementation of the program, Ontario’s reporting regulation aligns with the 
reporting requirements in Quebec and California.  This includes measurement of emissions to be 
within a 5% error range and production data to be within a 0.1% error range in 2017 (O. Reg. 
143/ 16, s. 26).   To support the collection of data and measurement of emissions to inform the 
allocation of free allowances, both process and combustion emissions are collected and verified 
in GHG reports.  Also, greater detail on the measurement requirements and reporting of biomass 
types will be required (MOECC, 2016a).  Relative to the last reporting regulation, the reporting 
refinements support the implementation of the cap and trade program and ensure a higher margin 
of accuracy in the quantification and verification of emissions.   
Quantification methods.  Based on the Reporting Regulation, there is a requirement to use 
standard quantification methods to quantify the amount of greenhouse gases from the specified 
GHG activity (O. Reg. 143/16, s. 4).  Alternative quantification approaches including the use of 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and 
Environment Canada quantification methods in measuring GHG emissions are permitted, if the 
emissions are the lesser of 20,000 tonnes and 3% of total emissions in the facility in a year (Ibid).   
To facilitate the measurement of emissions, most GHG activities will be measured from the 
Continuous Emission Monitoring System (CEMS) which obtains a continuous measurement of 
gas concentrations or emission rate from the combustion or industrial process with the use of 
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continuous monitors (Guideline for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting, 2016).  For 
measurement-based quantification, there is assurance that data is monitored at all emission 
points.  The quantification of emissions will be reported in accordance with standard 
quantification methods for specified GHG activities to enable standardization in the 
quantification of emissions across Ontario industries and jurisdictions.   
9.2  Reporting Requirement  
In 2008, Ontario joined The Climate Registry to work on a common GHG emissions reporting 
system with other states and provinces (MOECC, 2009).  To be consistent in threshold and 
emissions coverage in Quebec and California, Ontario lowered its reporting threshold from 
25,000 tonnes to 10,000 tonnes (MOECC, 2015b).  The reporting requirement may cease after 
2020 if facilities emit 40% of a facility that produces 25,000 tonnes of CO2e for the last three 
years of the compliance period (O. Reg. 143/16, s. 8).   
There are different reporting thresholds for mandatory participants.  A person who imports 
electricity will report and have verified all the emissions imported into Ontario.  The same 
applies to a person who supplies petroleum products for consumption in Ontario, whereby 200 
litres or more of petroleum product supplied during the year is reported and verified.  For natural 
gas distributors, the reporting threshold applies to emissions of at least 10,000 tonnes of CO2e or 
more.  The verification requirement applies to emissions greater than 25,000 tonnes of CO2e. 
Petroleum product supply.
25
  For petroleum product suppliers, the supplier reports the annual 
quantity of emissions that is first placed into the Ontario market, and the volume of biomass-
based fuel that may be blended with each petroleum product.  An attestation form is required to 
confirm the quantity of petroleum products received at the facility. 
Industrial activity.  Generally, the process and combustion emissions from CO2, CH4 and N2O, 
and relevant inputs are collected to support the calculation of greenhouse gas emissions.  The 
quantification of emissions supports the preparation of annual GHG reports that undergo third 
party verification.  Other product emissions that are reported include adipic acid, ammonia, 
carbonate use, cement, copper and nickel, ferroalloy, glass, hydrogen, iron and steel, lead, lime, 
                                                 
25
 See ON.390 of the Guideline for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting 
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magnesium, nitric acid, petrochemical, petroleum refining, phosphoric acid, aluminum, pulp and 
paper, refinery fuel, soda ash and zinc products.   
Electricity imports.
26
  The reporting of electricity imports includes the annual amounts of 
specified imports and any imported amounts from unspecified imports.  Based on California’s 
cap and trade program, the effectiveness of the reporting rules to regulate the carbon content of 
electricity imports have not been that effective at mitigating leakage.  Despite the use of 
emissions factors, leakage is not always mitigated if reshuffling and laundering takes place.   
Reshuffling, in the context of electricity imports, could occur if low-emitting or non-emitting 
resources that used to serve out-of-state energy were instead reassigned to serve Ontario; and 
higher-emitting, out-of-state resources that used to serve Ontario were instead reassigned to 
serve out-of-state power needs (Bushnell and Chen, 2012).  Since electricity exports are not 
subject to the default emissions factor, reshuffling may incentivize the flow of carbon-intensive 
exports to jurisdictions that do not have carbon prices.   
Laundering can take place if high-emitting, out-of-state power sources do not report the 
emissions content of their resources, and label the imported power as unspecified to take 
advantage of a lower emissions rate (Ibid).  To address reshuffling and laundering, the California 
Air Resources Board required each compliance entity to sign an attestation form claiming that 
the importer did not claim GHG reductions that were not real (Ibid).  No attestation form is 
required for Ontario electricity imports in Ontario.   
Electricity generation.
27
  Electricity generators report carbon emissions by fuel type, and 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions for all fuels combined.  The carbon content and heating 
value of each fuel are reported to calculate the carbon emissions.  To support the energy-use 
allocations for cogeneration facilities, the amount of thermal output including (and excluding) 
energy used for electricity generation, and the steam or heat imported from another facility, if 
applicable, are reported.  Process and fugitive emissions are reported, which include HFCs from 
cooling units that support power generation.  An attestation form is required to confirm the 
quantity of petroleum products received at the facility for natural gas fired generation.   
                                                 
26
 See ON.60 of the Guideline for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting 
27
 See ON.40 of the Guideline for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting 
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9.3  Verification of Emissions 
Facilities emitting greater than 25,000 tonnes of CO2e a year will be verified.  Emissions from 
biomass do not require verification (O. Reg. 143/16, s. 30).  The purpose of third party 
verification is to ensure there is a reasonable level of assurance that the GHG report does not 
contain any material discrepancy with the amount of emissions reported (supra, s. 32).  This 
involves reviewing whether the errors are less than 5% of the emissions reported or 0.1% of the 
production data.  This also includes a site visit for new facilities that are preparing their GHG 
reports for the first time.  The verification process supports collecting more accurate baseline 
data in 2017 and facilitates allowance purchase decisions to pace out future investments.   
Prior to submitting the GHG reports, the report must be accredited by a third party that is a 
member of the International Accreditation Forum (ISO 14065) and meets international standards 
(ISO 14064-3).
28
  This is to ensure that the accredited verification bodies providing the 
verification statement did not verify the GHG report (supra, s. 31).  The duty to verify only 
ceases for voluntary participants, whose facilities that emit less than 25,000 tonnes of CO2e in 
the last three years between 2018 and 2020 (supra, s. 11).   
9.4  Climate Change Action Plan Supporting GHG Reductions  
9.4.1  Measurability of Emissions Reductions  
To achieve significant greenhouse gas reductions in the coming decades, it relies on the 
conditions to support the reductions.  The re-investment of cap and trade proceeds in GHG 
reduction activities creates enabling conditions to reduce emissions significantly.  Although 
emission reductions of 9.8 million tonnes are planned to be achieved by 2020, not all emission 
reduction opportunities have been quantified.  Some of the benefits could be realized after 2020, 
support reductions in other sectors, or sequester carbon in the future.  Further, the cost of 
achieving reductions in non-capped sectors of the economy is unknown.  To ensure that emission 
reductions persist, the climate change action plan emphasizes the need for monitoring and 
evaluation of the action plan activities.  These objectives support greater transparency in 
emissions reporting to understand how the GHG reductions are driven and the costs to achieve 
them.  
                                                 
28
 Eligible accredited verification firms may be associated with the Standards Council of Canada and the American 
National Standards Institute and must demonstrate duties of impartiality by complying with ISO 14065.   
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9.4.2  Use of Complementary Sustainability Metrics  
Monitoring and evaluation of the initiatives can help inform the province’s long-term energy 
plan and climate policy direction to achieve sustainability.  Complementary metrics could be 
used to supplement the evaluation of activities in the climate change action plan in the future.  
Some proposed approaches are discussed. 
Mitigate adverse impact with adaptive management plan.  In California, it uses adaptive 
management plan to assess whether environmental changes including localized air quality 
impacts, forest impacts, or other direct and indirect changes are caused by its cap and trade 
program or U.S. Forest Protocol.  California’s adaptive management plan provides oversight on 
the program, ensuring the realization of emission reductions and keeping the public and the 
regulatory board informed of the impacts attributable to the cap and trade regulation (Air 
Ressources Board, 2015).  For Ontario, a potential way to monitor and protect the environment 
from adverse changes could include consideration of social and environment safeguards to 
mitigate adverse impacts, which is an initiative that California is exploring. 
Assess potential with exergy analysis.  Exergy is a thermodynamic analysis that assesses the 
quality of the energy input (or the work potential) to the output produced.  This approach can 
identify efficiency improvements, reductions in thermodynamic losses attributable to sustainable 
technologies, and the environmental and economic benefits of green technologies to increase 
their utilization (Rosen et al., 2008).  The use of exergy analysis is known to be effective at 
finding opportunities and has potential to increase the penetration of renewable energy 
technologies, evaluating hydrogen production technologies, and measuring emission reductions 
(Rosen et al., 2008; Jalalzadeh-Azar, 2008).  Using exergy analysis to evaluate the feasibility of 
new action plan initiatives can support the growth and penetration of renewable energy and 
energy storage technologies.   
Model carbon flows to measure the emissions from biomass production.  In the climate change 
action plan, there is a focus on sustainable forestry management, tree planting, soil and grass 
production, and the development of a land-use carbon inventory to track data on carbon flows.  
Due to the significance of biomass to mitigate climate change, it has warranted greater 
understanding of the cycling of carbon from biomass production to assess how efficient and 
effective carbon can be stored on land.  It is anticipated that deeper understanding in this area 
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will take place to learn how to achieve true carbon neutrality, prompting the need to monitor the 
production and consumption of biomass. 
Various factors need to be considered in managing land-use and biomass development.  An 
example is provided to illustrate the considerations (Cushman, Marland and Schlamadinger, 
n.d.).  If there is high quality soil, the land will be more productive to support the growth of new 
trees.  Fast growing trees can displace more fossil fuels for each harvest in each cycle, but it 
could be slower for a mature tree depending on previously absorbed emissions.  When biomass is 
burned, the release of carbon will harvest growth of new trees.  If the rate of new tree growth is 
slower than the rate of carbon emitted from the burning of biomass, the net carbon emissions can 
increase and negate the fact that biomass is indeed carbon neutral.  Carbon cycling is also 
affected by whether or not the biomass product displaces short or long lived products.  
Therefore, the net carbon balance depends on the amount of biomass on the land, how fast the 
trees can grow, and how efficiently it is harvested and converted to useful energy.  These factors 
should be considered in land-use management practices to support the production and 
consumption of biomass. 
9.5  Assessment 
Due to the harmonization of systems with the WCI, Ontario’s quantification, reporting and 
verification methods have been revised to be similar to the reporting regulation in Quebec and 
California.  The emissions reported must be accurate within 5% and 0.1% of the measurement 
and production of greenhouse gas emissions.  The reporting threshold in Ontario has been 
lowered from 25,000 tonnes to 10,000 tonnes of CO2e per year, which includes mandatory 
reporting from voluntary facilities.  A robust measurement, reporting and verification process for 
greenhouse gas emissions will promote consistency and standardization across the WCI.   
The requirement to report greater detail on biomass types in Ontario appears to be necessary, as 
the use of biomass can affect the amount of free allowances provided to the industry.  Emissions 
from the combustion of biomass at facilities will not require verification.  However, the use of 
biomass will be significant as it allows carbon-neutral facilities to retain more free allowances as 
permitted by the moderate decline in the cap adjustment decline factor.  
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The accuracy in the measurement of process emissions can prevent the risk of over-allocation of 
free allowances.  From a measurement perspective, the persistence of facility emissions can be 
achieved with continuous monitoring of emissions and a better understanding how GHG 
emission reductions are driven from different processes.  To ensure sustained emission 
reductions, it will depend on the measurability of emission sources from GHG reduction 
activities.  The measurability of emissions will pertain to the reductions in a facility’s 
combustion emissions that are subject to an annual decline factor by 2020.   
From a reporting perspective, only emissions greater than 25,000 tonnes of CO2e at facilities 
require mandatory verification.  Emissions between 10,000 and 25,000 tonnes of CO2e are 
reported.  Emissions below 10,000 tonnes of CO2e and the use of biomass do not require 
reporting.  The reporting process ensures that larger emitters producing a larger share of the 
emissions will be verified.  The emissions from smaller sources could be expected to grow at a 
faster pace, as voluntary facilities may participate and trade excess allowances with mandatory 
participants.   
The opportunities available to reduce emissions will be policy-driven to enforce significant 
changes to the built environment.  As the cap and trade system will generate proceeds to support 
further emission reduction activities, it will be critical to ensure enforceability and 
implementation of the climate change action plan activities.  Although the conditions for a low-
carbon economy are created in the action plan, some initiatives beyond building retrofits and 
electric vehicle implementation may be more complex and require longer implementation 
timelines to realize the greenhouse gas benefits.  Successful implementation of the action plan 
will be dependent on timing, program uptake and the cost of achieving the emission reductions.   
California uses complementary policies to achieve 85% of its emission reductions with 15% of 
emission reductions achieved with carbon prices at less than $18 per tonne.  This compares with 
British Columbia that has achieved 5-15% emission reductions and reduction in fuel 
consumption with its $30 per tonne carbon tax (Murray and Rivers, 2015).  To ensure impact in 
Ontario, it will continue to be important to clearly attribute emissions reductions from policy 
initiatives, codes and standards, and emissions trading to assess the drivers of emission 
reductions and the costs to achieve the reductions.  As Ontario is in its early years of the 2050 
deep decarbonisation pathway, it could be useful to enhance measurability of emissions by 
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assessing how the industry is responding to the increased cost of production, how allowances are 
used, and how emission reduction opportunities are identified.   
As the demand for energy is generally inelastic and carbon prices will be relatively contained in 
the next few years, it enhances the attractiveness of complementary policies to support the cap 
and trade program and encourage economy-wide change.  As a result, achieving significant 
economy-wide emission reductions are likely to be achieved with the scale and scope of 
complementary policy measures.  However, significant emission reductions will be realized after 
the measure’s implementation.   
A forthcoming consideration is the potential role and scale of offsets from agriculture, forestry 
and lands.  Offsets should yield reductions that are real, quantifiable, additional, enforceable, 
verifiable and permanent.  As discussed earlier, Ontario could consider the costs and benefits of 
enforcing harmonized protocols within the WCI and increasing stakeholder engagement in the 
development of its offsets protocols.  This can ensure standardization in the baseline of offsets, 
comparability and acceptability of projects in all jurisdictions.  A common offset protocol and 
offset registry system in the WCI could support the measurability of emission reductions from 
offsets.  
To complement the climate change action plan initiatives, the consideration of sustainability 
indicators to evaluate future mitigation activities is anticipated to improve the social-economic 
and environmental relationships of implementing climate policy on the environment.   
10.  Integration with Other Measures 
The low-carbon transition set out in the climate change action plan establishes the climate policy 
context in Ontario.  This analysis focuses on the integration of the climate change action plan 
initiatives with broader political, economic and environmental policy objectives.   
10.1  Politics of Ontario’s Climate Policy 
The political effort to re-introduce cap and trade after 2008 was led by the provincial Liberal 
government and resulted in Ontario’s first major climate policy announced in 2016.  This 
announcement came at time when the new federal Liberal government came to power in 2015 
and supported putting a price on carbon.  The decision to use a cap and trade program in Ontario 
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owes to the flexibility of using multi-year compliance periods, providing businesses with the 
option to choose their compliance path to meet climate change goals (MOECC, 2016c).  The 
basis of the climate change action plan initiatives were informed by the Ontario Climate 
Strategy, which was developed on the feedback from consultations with the public on an 
Ontario-made strategy to fight climate change. 
The analysis that follows will provide an overview of the expectations that Ontario’s climate 
policy can have on the politics within government, relationships with stakeholders, and its 
alignment with provincial and federal climate policy goals. 
Politics within government.  With the climate change action plan, it laid out near-term changes 
that will be affected by climate change mitigation strategies.  With changes to legislation to 
come, policymakers will need to coordinate within the government and manage the policy and 
approvals processes.  There are plans to amend a broad range of frameworks that include 
changes in the municipal land-use process, energy planning process, provincial environmental 
assessments, Ontario Building Code, renewable fuel standards, renewable content requirement 
for natural gas, and tax changes for zero emission vehicles and low-carbon technologies.  
Because of the time required to institutionalize changes to the built environment, it will be 
challenging to achieve significant emission reductions across the economy until after the policies 
are implemented. 
It is expected that the provincial government will work with the federal government to secure 
funding and ensure that federal infrastructure support aligns with provincial climate change 
objectives (MOECC, 2016c).  These collaborations are expected to develop inter-governmental 
climate mitigation initiatives.  To ensure that enabling policies in the action plan are 
implemented, the government will need to manage potential barriers affecting the policy’s 
implementation. 
Politics between government and stakeholders.  Following the 2015 Fall Economic Statement, 
$325 million was made through the Green Investment Fund as a down-payment to the cap and 
trade program to fund potential emission reduction initiatives.  With cap and trade, there will be 
differential impacts among industries.  To maintain competitiveness and sustained GHG 
reductions that are not leaked outside of Ontario, the EITE sectors will receive transitional 
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assistance and accommodations until at least 2020.  To ensure the cost of free allowances is 
accounted for, the government has confirmed through legislation that transitional assistance will 
be phased out with announcements to be made by 2021. 
Alignment with provincial and federal climate policy goals.  Based on the goals of the 2016-
2020 climate change action plan, Ontario’s climate policy direction is consistent with the spirit 
of decarbonizing the energy system and global trend to build a sustainable energy transition.  By 
the end of the first compliance period, Ontario’s cap and trade program is expected to meet 
provincial greenhouse gas targets in support of national emission goals.  With a forthcoming 
national carbon pricing regime for Canada, there may be impacts on Ontario’s minimum prices, 
if the national floor price were above $18 per tonne.  Canada’s forthcoming federal carbon policy 
is expected to send a strong signal for behavioural change from citizens, businesses and 
provincial governments.   
10.2  Economic Policy Considerations 
With the implementation of the Ontario’s cap and trade program, there are implications on the 
economy including the prospect for jobs, exports, investment opportunities and trade impacts 
with Alberta. 
Creation of clean jobs.  To achieve emission reductions, this will need to be achieved by 
deploying low-carbon technologies and electrifying the energy system.  Although pre-mature, it 
is expected that the climate policy will create new jobs in Ontario to build the low-carbon 
economy.  Along with implementing infrastructure changes to the transportation and buildings 
sector to electrify the economy, the expectation for new jobs ought to come from the work 
needed in exploring R&D projects aimed at commercializing clean technologies (McCarthy, 
2016b).  As aging baby boomers also retire in the next few decades, the ability to build the low-
carbon future creates an urgent need for skilled labour and expertise in the energy sector.   
Development of a clean electricity exports market.  Increased demand for electricity from the 
electrification of the economy is expected to require significant transmission infrastructure 
growth.  This will depend on the approval of transmission infrastructure to transport power to the 
south (Yakabusiki, 2016).  It is also anticipated that Ontario will support the U.S. and Mexico in 
reaching the 50% clean energy target by 2025 with Canadian electricity exports to meet the 
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Clean Power Plan goals (McCarthy, 2016b).  For the next ten years, Ontario’s clean energy 
exports to the U.S. could have implications on the role of natural gas, biomass and energy 
storage or other means, as the Darlington and Bruce nuclear stations complete refurbishment in 
2025 and 2031.  
Support for investment opportunities.  The requirement to participate in the cap and trade 
program will increase the regulatory costs to investors that own carbon-intensive facilities in 
Ontario.  The Ontario government plans to increase the adoption of clean energy technologies 
with incentives, tax credits for R&D, and favourable depreciation rates for low-carbon 
technologies to promote Ontario’s investment climate (MOECC, 2016c).  Climate change 
presents a $5 trillion global business opportunity in clean energy investments funded by private 
investors who need to understand the risks of climate change (Parkinson, 2016).  From an 
investor’s perspective, the cap and trade program should include transparent, consistent and 
reliable reporting of GHG emissions to help businesses price the value of carbon in their 
investments (Ibid).   
The Ontario climate change action plan will create a Green Bank to provide low-interest 
financing for projects and aggregate larger commercial and industrial projects to reduce risk 
(Ibid).  The Green Bank initiative was modelled from Vermont and New York to fund low-
carbon technology growth.  As access to financing has been a challenge experienced by 
homeowners and businesses to undertake deeper retrofits, the Green Bank is expected to serve 
the needs of Ontario consumers and save costs by aggregating the financing services of 
commercial banks.  In Ontario, for example, heat pump technologies are prohibitively expensive 
to include as measures in residential natural gas demand-side management programs.  These 
projects will not be economic for customers to pursue, even after the utility incentives are 
provided.
29
  Now, with an independent entity that provides additional financing services to 
customers to encourage the adoption of clean technologies, the Green Bank will be critical in 
enabling the low-carbon transition. 
                                                 
29
 See technical conference materials in 2015-2020 DSM Proceeding for Ontario’s DSM Plans. 
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Impacts on Trade.  With a cap and trade program in 2017, petroleum products and electricity 
imports entering the Ontario market will be required to comply with the program.  The carbon 
content of other traded goods and services are not subject to the regulation.   
In terms of domestic trade impacts, it questions how the trade relationship between Ontario and 
Alberta may be affected.  Alberta will be phasing out coal by 2030 and is moving towards a 
carbon tax by 2017.  In Ontario, there are policies towards electrification, using renewable 
content in natural gas, and implementing greener codes and standards in buildings.  In May 2016, 
Ontario and Alberta signed a Memorandum of Understanding to examine the opportunities to 
reduce GHG emissions in the production, transportation and use of natural resources, to 
accelerate renewable energy and storage development and to foster uses of carbon emissions 
(MOECC, 2016).  Innovation in trade of cleaner energy and technological development 
continues to be expected from the strategic alliance.  
In terms of international trade impacts, hypothetical situations are discussed below regarding the 
potential impacts that Ontario’s climate legislation may have on trade.  The free trade 
agreements that Ontario are engaged in include the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA).  
Trade with U.S. and Mexico in NAFTA (in force).  Since 1994, the NAFTA came into effect and 
has doubled the GDP of North America to $20 trillion in 2014 (Global Affairs Canada, 2016).  
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation was created as a side treaty to 
NAFTA to collectively conserve, protect and enhance the environment for the well-being of 
present and future generations (North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 
n.d.). 
It has been questioned whether lax environmental regulations in Mexico within the NAFTA 
incentivized U.S. firms to relocate, which increased U.S. job losses, reduced competitiveness in 
U.S. products, and increased border-area pollution (Tiemann, 2000).  The impact of Ontario’s 
cap and trade regulation on the reshuffling of products and relocations to other jurisdictions 
within the NAFTA has not been examined extensively.  Although the potential for carbon 
leakage has been assessed to be insignificant, the interest in a federally-administered border 
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adjustment appears to be reasonable to mitigate the risk of reshuffling goods to jurisdictions 
without a carbon price.   
Trade with Asia-Pacific Countries in TPP (in consultation).   If the TPP comes into effect, it 
replaces NAFTA and forms the largest free trade zone in the world comprised of 12 countries
30
 
making up 40% of the world’s GDP ($28.5 trillion) (Curry, 2016).  In the TPP agreement, there 
are environmental stipulations that demonstrate support for climate change mitigation.  This 
shows that cooperation in the transition to the low carbon economy was stipulated to prevent 
investor-state disputes: 
“The Parties recognise that each Party’s actions to transition to a low emissions 
economy should reflect domestic circumstances and capabilities and, consistent 
with Article 20.12 (Cooperation Frameworks), Parties shall cooperate to address 
matters of joint or common interest.  
 
Areas of cooperation may include, but are not limited to: energy efficiency; 
development of cost-effective, low emissions technologies and alternative, clean 
and renewable energy sources; sustainable transport and sustainable urban 
infrastructure development; addressing deforestation and forest degradation; 
emissions monitoring; market and non-market mechanisms; low emissions, 
resilient development and sharing of information and experiences in addressing 
this issue. Further, the Parties shall, as appropriate, engage in cooperative and 
capacity-building activities related to transitioning to a low emissions economy.”
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Trade with the European Union in CETA (not yet in force).  The Canada and European Union 
free trade agreement will provide Canada with access to the world’s largest market, totalling $20 
trillion in GDP (Global Affairs Canada, 2016a).  The CETA contains parallel provisions with 
Canada’s North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation that includes a 
commitment that parties must enforce domestic environmental laws (Global Affairs Canada, 
2016b).   
                                                 
30
 The 12 countries in the TPP include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, U.S. and Vietnam. 
31
 See Article 20.15 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Global Affairs Canada, 2016). 
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Prospect for Border Carbon Adjustments.  As discussed earlier, Ontario indicated an interest to 
have a federally-administered border carbon adjustment (MOECC, 2016c).  Border adjustments 
can ensure that there is no cost advantage to produce goods in non-regulated jurisdiction.   
The urgency with border carbon adjustments can also be seen by the fact that Ontario’s record of 
GHG emissions with imported GHG emissions could go up by 50% (Dolter and Victor, 2016).  
This measure may be useful for managing carbon leakage, as transitional assistance is planned to 
be phased out.   
Along with the political and legal challenges, there could be complications to trade agreements 
regarding the goods and services entering Canadian borders, especially when other trade partners 
do not use border adjustments.  With border adjustments, the issue of re-shuffling may not be 
resolved and there could be administrative costs associated with using and regulating the border 
adjustment (Whitmore, 2012).   
10.3  Environmental Policy Considerations 
In terms of environmental policy considerations arising from Ontario’s cap and trade program, 
the vision towards climate change mitigation broadly affects two areas: updates to 
Environmental Assessments to account for climate change and sustainable use of agriculture, 
forests and lands to store carbon.   
Impact of Climate Change on Environmental Assessment.  Environmental assessments (EA) are 
a process to ensure that governments and public bodies consider the potential environmental 
effects before an infrastructure project begins (MOECC, 2016d).  For federally-administered 
EAs, the inclusion of climate change impacts in the EA process is consistent with broader 
climate change policy.  As the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) notes, EAs 
should consider where a project can contribute to greenhouse gases and where climate change 
may affect a project at all stages of the EA process (Appendix 11 of this report).  To manage the 
risks associated with climate change on projects, the CEEA argues for consistent consideration 
of climate change in the EA process across federal and provincial jurisdictions (Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency, 2016).   
For provincially-administered EAs in Ontario, changes to the current EA process to consider 
climate change mitigation and adaptation could be significant.  However, the draft changes to 
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Ontario’s EAs to account for climate change impacts were not publicly available, so the changes 
and scope of the impacts are not known.  It is expected that the incorporation of climate change 
mitigation in provincial-led environmental assessment will be similar to federal considerations.  
Sustainable Resource Development of Agriculture, Forests and Lands.  As noted in Ontario’s 
action plan, maintaining productive and sustainable agriculture, nature and lands can set the 
pathway for creating offsets for the Ontario cap and trade program.  There are major plans to 
strengthen these sectors, particularly to maximize carbon storage from agriculture, develop a 
forest carbon policy framework, expand the Greenbelt to enable sequestration potential, and 
protect grasslands to store carbon (MOECC, 2016d).  These initiatives are not known at the 
implementation stage.  It reinforces the need to develop a strategy to monitor the development 
and the use of carbon sinks to support the cap and trade program in Ontario.   
10.4  Assessment 
Ontario’s environmental policy shift towards decarbonizing the energy system supports Canada’s 
commitment on climate change mitigation.  This section explored the potential implications of 
the Ontario climate policy for political, economic and environmental policy considerations.   
In terms of political considerations, there will be major energy use changes from switching fossil 
fuels to renewable energy and electricity.  This policy shift affects how transportation will be 
fuelled and how heat and power are sourced for heating and cooling needs in residential, 
commercial and industrial buildings.  The Ontario Building Code is planned to include long-term 
GHG targets to align with provincial emission goals, and the renewable fuel content for 
petroleum products and natural gas are expected to increase.  In addition, there are planned 
changes to municipal land-use planning and environmental assessment, consumer protection 
measures for low-income consumers affected by carbon prices, and the need for community 
empowerment.  Besides the challenge that many of these policies are at a formative stage, the 
changes are complex and require time to implement and enforce.  The climate change challenge 
on the political process strengthens the need for collaboration between all levels of government.  
There is an ongoing need for alignment in provincial long-term goals and objectives with 
forthcoming federal climate policy to ensure effective execution of climate policy.   
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In terms of economic policy considerations, there are major economic opportunities from 
increasing the deployment of low-carbon technologies to accelerate the low-carbon transition.  
Clean jobs and investment opportunities are expected to come with the implementation of the 
climate change action plan.  Low-interest financing opportunities will be accelerated with the 
Green Bank, provided that its implementation is successful in accelerating low-carbon 
technological growth.  In the future, it could be useful to study how sustainable technologies 
accelerated through Ontario’s climate policy, particularly from cap and trade, are contributing to 
behavioural transitions in the economy that can guide the future of technological development. 
In terms of environmental policy considerations, the inclusion of climate change in the EA 
process has the potential to identify project risks earlier and lower future costs of compliance.  
With considerable interest in leveraging the natural environment as carbon sinks, it supports 
continued monitoring of the environment and how it will be used to displace emissions from 
fossil fuels.  To build greater resiliency and adaptive capacity to climate change, it would be 
beneficial to review the implementation of the cap and trade program, progress on the climate 
change action plan, long-term goals and alignment with forthcoming federal climate policy.   
11.  Risk Analysis  
The Ontario market design has closely mirrored the market design of Quebec and California to 
facilitate the transition process once Ontario links within the WCI.  As allowances are traded in 
the market, it is expected to facilitate price discovery of the marginal cost to abate.  Liquidity in 
the market is expected in the Ontario market as the price relies on the same carbon price in the 
joint Quebec and California auctions.  The market design features promote cost containment (e.g. 
price floor, price ceiling and strategic reserve) but allow for flexibility within the rules that can 
increase program costs.   
As for the re-investment of cap and trade proceeds into activities that reduce greenhouse gases, 
the measurability and sustainability of the emission reductions are largely expected to come from 
the projects invested.  There will be a significant cost to implement the climate change action 
plan.  The policy design assumes $1.8-1.9 billion in revenues to be collected each year, but 
expected revenues may fall if fuel distributors purchase fewer emission allowances than 
expected.  Additionally, as 20% of the action plan activities do not yield greenhouse benefits 
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until after 2020, some action plan initiatives may impose higher costs for monitoring and 
evaluation.  Generally, emissions that cannot be measured easily are less feasible to administer 
(Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, 2008).   
Other issues associated with the policy implementation are the significant upgrades to the 
transmission and distribution system to accommodate electrification of transportation (Pollitt, 
2008).  To enable integration of low-carbon technologies with the energy system, there may be 
potential costs of recovery of long-term stranded assets that could be replaced with shorter-life 
distributed generation technologies.  This will be fuelled by the adoption of sustainable 
technologies with incentives and low-interest financing that is expected to increase the 
technology’s achievable potential in the marketplace.  With the accelerated pace to the low-
carbon transition, there may be further consideration on future energy system planning to 
optimize GHG emissions, which may be considered along with the current challenges of 
reforming the distribution network to enable greater participation of distributed technologies on 
the electricity network. 
12.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
In summary, the findings from this evaluation indicate that complementary policies funded by 
the cap and trade program will be an important aspect of enhancing emission reductions and 
achieving low-cost compliance through the carbon market.  The scope of Ontario’s climate 
policy set out a preliminary action plan describing the potential impact of the $8.3 billion in cap 
and trade proceeds in forthcoming initiatives and policies to reduce greenhouse gases 
significantly.  If the action plan is implemented successfully, it will create the conditions to help 
Ontario achieve long term, sustainable emission reductions.   
There are areas of the cap and trade regulation that are not finalized, including the criteria for 
offsets and early reduction credits, administrative penalties, and complementary policies for 
reserve fuels used on First Nations lands.  Due to potential concern on the carbon neutrality of 
biomass, expected progression of the price path, enforceability of the submission requirement 
and required time to implement the action plan, it can be perceived to weaken the success of the 
cap and trade program.  Nevertheless, the design of the cap and trade program is accommodating 
and flexible to industry participants, whose design adheres to WCI design principles.  With 
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multi-year compliance periods to achieve emission reductions in a cost-effective manner, it 
creates the opportunity to assess how program participants will best respond to carbon prices, 
either through investments in long-term abatement technologies or purchases of allowances or 
credits.  Finally, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the carbon price in isolation of 
complementary policies as the mechanisms should work hand-in-hand.  This evaluation of the 
cap and trade regulation has offered some insight on the program’s effectiveness using the six 
criteria framework. 
First, there is comprehensive coverage of emissions that supports low-cost compliance, fair 
treatment of emissions in the cap and trade program, and sufficient annual declines to meet the 
2020 targets.  During the first compliance period, 82% of the province’s emissions will be 
regulated under the cap that declines annually at an average rate of 4.1% to achieve a 15% 
emissions reduction target by 2020.  There is a level playing field established for domestic 
electricity generation and imports, regulation of emissions from combined heat and power 
facilities, as well as facilities generating thermal energy directly and indirectly.   
Second, based on quantifiable costs and benefits, there could be greater gains from the allocation 
of allowances accruing to the industry than to consumers in the first compliance period.  This is 
initially owing to the cost of free allowances and the allowances for the fuel distributors paid by 
consumers.  Over time, it is expected that the cap and trade proceeds will be re-invested in 
activities that significantly reduce the energy costs for households and contribute to greater 
societal benefits that persist after 2020.   This is also supported by an estimate that 80% of the 
benefits from cap and trade proceeds will accrue to consumers.  However, many action plan 
initiatives beyond building retrofit and electric vehicle implementation are formative at this time, 
and may require more time to be implemented to realize the emissions reduction benefits.  
Although it is not known with certainty when free allowances will cease, transitional assistance 
is planned to be phased out. 
Third, Ontario’s market design is consistent with Quebec and California to enhance linkage 
opportunities in the future.  The evaluation of the market design shows that Ontario’s program 
meets the criteria of being efficient and transparent, but it requires further studies to determine 
effectiveness of the carbon price in achieving significant emission reductions.  In expectation of 
a carbon price that reaches $100 per tonne in Ontario by 2030, the starting prices today may not 
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be a large enough opportunity cost to signal immediate behavioural change.  This places 
emphasis on the re-investment of cap and trade proceeds to finance complementary measures 
that transform the market and reduce emissions across the economy.  Over the course of the next 
couple of decades from 2030 to 2050, the baselines for greenhouse gas reductions would have 
risen with the deployment of low-carbon technologies in homes and businesses, market 
transformation from renewable fuel content standards and electrification, and increasing cost-
effectiveness of new technologies that become deployed to lower the demand for natural gas and 
emission allowances in Ontario.  Given the potential negating impact that low-carbon and 
renewable policies can have on carbon pricing, it is unclear whether the future carbon price 
trajectory needs to remain between $100 and $300 per tonne in 2030 and 2050.  It is also pre-
mature to comment on the enforceability of the submission requirement, pending finalization of 
the administrative penalties.  However, stipulating timelines for the 3 to 1 submission 
requirement could enhance enforceability of the submission requirement.  Ontario’s cap and 
trade market is expected to use the CITSS to save infrastructure costs once linking occurs.  Due 
to the checks in the bid and auction processes that enforce the purchase and holding rules, higher 
monitoring and oversight costs could be expected.   
Fourth, in terms of accommodations, the cost of free allowances represents a total of $3.27 
billion by the end the first compliance period.  The basis for allocations will be supported by 
verified emissions prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Reporting Regulation.  
The accommodations to industry are generous, but should be reasonable in the context of 
expected emissions growth in the coming years, and appropriate to provide for transitory 
assistance to mitigate uneconomic investments to reduce process and combustion emissions.  
The use of auction and transitional assistance also attains the highest net GHG reductions at the 
lowest cost.  The extent of transitional assistance provided is expected to help the industries that 
need it the most. 
In terms of flexibility arrangements, there will be exemptions primarily for large increases in 
production for large emitters and a more moderate decline of free allowances for facilities using 
biofuels.  Transitory assistance appears to be provided to help large emitters prepare for 
significant actions after 2020.  With free allowances and flexibility arrangements that relaxes 
certain program rules, it will be important to ensure accurate reporting of the emissions produced 
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and true-up of the allowances.  For those receiving transitory assistance, this ensures that 
program participants are accountable for the cost of producing emissions that are covered with 
free allowances.   
Fifth, in terms of the measurability of emissions, a robust measurement, reporting and 
verification process is in place in Ontario to enable effective and consistent quantification and 
reporting of emissions with Quebec and California.  To ensure sustainable reductions in the long 
run, it requires successful enforcement of action plan initiatives, monitoring of the initiatives 
funded by cap and trade proceeds, and consideration of complementary metrics to evaluate 
prospective climate change action plan initiatives. 
Sixth, Ontario’s climate policy will integrate well with broader provincial and federal 
government objectives.  Some actions have immediate implication to make changes to current 
legislation that will affect the built environment.  The creation of the cap and trade program is 
expected to integrate with economic policy, as climate policy is expected to build economic 
prosperity from clean jobs, a clean exports market and investment opportunities.  Due to the 
expanded function of the environment in their potential capacity as offsets, it indicates a 
significant need to protect and maintain the environment.  The following recommendations are 
provided to inform near-term development of the cap and trade program regulation. 
Recommendations 
1. Continue to monitor the performance of the market rules to create an efficient, transparent, 
enforceable and effective market for many years to come. 
2. Monitor the rates of emission decline by industry and GHG activity to identify where 
emission reductions are occurring and the cost of reductions at the facility level. 
3. Assess the performance of Ontario’s flexibility arrangements provided over time, along with 
the potential impact of accommodations and flexibility arrangements on the pace of change 
and stringency of the emissions cap.  
4. Ensure that the action plan initiatives are implemented in a cost-effective and sustainable 
manner.  This should be considered with sustainability metrics to evaluate the potential and 
impact of emission reductions in future policy actions. 
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5. Continue to engage in understanding the flow of carbon in the environment and ways to 
achieve true carbon neutrality from the production and consumption of biomass. 
6. Monitor the purpose of the offsets, how they will be used and maintained.  There could be 
standardization in the baseline of offsets to enhance comparability and the acceptability of 
projects through harmonized offset protocols within the WCI, where feasible. 
7. Review the implementation of the cap and trade program, progress of the action plan, long-
term goals of the program, and alignment with forthcoming federal climate policy.    
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Appendix 1:  Emissions in Ontario by Sector and Source (2013 Actuals) 
 
Source:  Re-organization of Table A10–13 of the National Inventory Report for Ontario’s 2013 GHG emissions in the 
Part 3 submission to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by sector.   
 
Notes:  CO2 accounted for 84% of 2013 emissions.  CH4 accounted for 10% of 2013 emissions (GWP of 21).  N2O 
accounted for 5% of 2013 emissions (GWP of 310).  HFC accounted for 1% of 2013 emissions.  SF6 emissions from 
electrical equipment are accounted for in “Production and Consumption of Halocarbons” and represented 1% of 
2013 emissions (GWP of 23,900).   
  
2013 GHG Emissions (MT of CO2e) in 
Ontario
CO2  CH4 N20 HFC SF6 PFC NF3 Total
% of Total: 
By Sector
Transport        59          0.2          2       -         -         -         -        61 36%
Road Transportation        45          0.1          1      46 
Other Transportation          9          0.1          1      10 
Railways          2      0.002       0.1        2 
Domestic Aviation          2      0.002     0.02        2 
Domestic Navigation          1      0.003     0.03        1 
Industry        43             1       0.2     2.3     0.3       -         -        47 27%
Petroleum Refining Industries 6 0.0011 0.009        6 
Mining and Upstream Oil and Gas 
Production
0.6 0.0003 0.008        1 
Manufacturing industries 16       0.02       0.1          16 
Construction 0.4      0.0002   0.004     0.4 
Agriculture and Forestry 2         0.001     0.01       1.6 
Fugitive Sources (e.g. coal mining and 
natural gas and oil)
      0.3             1     0.01        1 
Mineral Products (e.g. cement, lime and 
mineral products use)
         4        4 
Metal Production          8     0.2        8 
Production and Consumption of Halocarbons        2     0.1        2 
Non-Energy Products from Fuels and Solvent 
Use
         7        7 
Other Product Manufacture and Use     0.01       0.1     0.1 
Buildings        31             1       0.4       -         -         -         -        32 19%
Residential 19       1            0.3          20 
Commercial and Institutional 12       0.01       0.1          12 
Electricity        11          0.1       0.1       -         -         -         -        11 6%
Agriculture       0.2 5 6       -         -         -         -        10 6%
Waste 0.2 9 0.3       -         -         -         -          9 5%
Total Emissions by Source (MT of CO2e) 144 17 8 2     0.3       -         -      171 
% of Total: By Emission Source 84% 10% 5% 1% 0.1% 100%
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Appendix 2:  Product-Output Benchmark and Historical Absolute Allocations 
 
Source:  Methodology for Free Allowances Distribution (Ontario’s Cap and Trade Program) 
 
Source:  Reporting Guidelines  Notes: Example showing emission factors used for limestone and dolomite in the 
product-output method above (Items 1 and 2 of Table 1b)  
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Source:  Methodology for Free Allowances Distribution (Ontario’s Cap and Trade Program) 
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Appendix 3:  Potential Distribution of Free Allowances by Allocation Method (a simplified 
approach using 2013 emissions)  
 
 
Source:  2013 greenhouse gas emissions reporting by facility.  Note:   This chart shows estimated allocation 
proportions by method that assumes for simplicity one allowance per emission produced undifferentiated by 
emission type, and may have discrepancies with the final allocations in the Methodology for Free Allowances 
Distribution released on May 16, 2016.    
Allocation Methodology for 
Free Allowances
 2013 GHG 
(MT) 
 2013 GHG (tonnes) 
Percentage 
Allocation of 
Total
Product Output Benchmark                     17                15,058,265 58% 58%=100
  Iron & Steel Mfg.                     10                10,428,497 36% 62%
  Cement Mfg.                       4                  4,396,389 15% 26%
  Petroleum Refineries                    1.4                  1,350,373 5% 8%
  Hydrogen                       1                     508,641 2% 3%
  Beer Mfg.                    0.1                       92,932 0% 1%
Energy Use Allocations                       3                  7,412,303 9% 9%=100
  Chemical Fertilizer (except Potash) Mfg.                       1                     798,641 3% 31%
  Automobile & Light-Duty Motor Vehicle Mfg.                       1                     535,038 2% 21%
  Food Mfg.                       1                     511,869 2% 20%
  Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg.                    0.5                     478,053 2% 19%
  Particle Board & Fibreboard Mills                    0.1                       89,460 0% 3%
  Chemical                    0.1                       68,878 0% 3%
  Pharmaceutical & Medicine Mfg.                  0.05                       46,456 0% 2%
  Gold & Silver Ore Mining                  0.03                       32,661 0% 1%
Historical Allocations                       9                  7,074,244 31% 31%=100
  Pulp and paper                       2                  1,572,907 5% 18%
  Chemical Pulp Mills                       4                  3,534,787 12% 40%
  Petrochemical Mfg.                       2                  1,624,010 6% 18%
  Non-Ferrous (except Al) Smelting & Refining                    0.5                     491,717 2% 6%
  All Other Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg.                    0.4                     430,655 1% 5%
  Other Petroleum & Coal Products Mfg.                    0.4                     373,605 1% 4%
  Artificial & Synthetic Fibres & Filaments Mfg                    0.3                     319,449 1% 4%
  Steam & Air-Conditioning Supply                    0.2                     196,878 1% 2%
  All Other Non-Metallic Mineral Product Mfg.                    0.1                     131,343 0% 1%
  Resin & Synthetic Rubber Mfg.                    0.1                       92,779 0% 1%
  Glass Mfg.                    0.1                       65,487 0% 1%
  Clay Building Material & Refractory Mfg.                    0.1                       56,104 0% 1%
Direct Allocations                    0.6                     224,199 2% 2%=100
  Universities                    0.3                     345,316 1% 5%
  Energy from Waste                    0.2                     150,607 1% 67%
  Waste Treatment & Disposal                    0.1                       73,592 0% 33%
Indirect Useful Thermal Energy (Imported)  n/a  n/a  n/a Method E n/a
Grand Total                     29                29,769,011 100%
Potential Allocation by NAICs
Method A
Method D
Method C
Method B
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Appendix 4:  Regression Methodology to Estimate Competitiveness Effects on EITE 
Industries in Ontario 
 
Methodology 
The regression methodology used in testing the Ontario’s competitiveness effects follows the 
economic theory used in Aldy and Pizer of Resources of the Future in 2009 to assess the 
competitiveness impacts of climate change mitigation policies in the U.S.   
For Ontario, it is analyzed for six EITE industries using data from 2005-2015 that could be 
compared with the results of the U.S. study.  Production is measured by total exports leaving 
Ontario and domestic consumption is measured by the gross domestic product.  The percent 
difference between production and consumption is the net production effect outside of the 
province that could assess the degree of leakage, or a lost competitiveness, due to the 
internalization of the price of carbon.  In the U.S. study, the impacts of competitiveness of the 
manufacturing firms were estimated with a $15/tonne carbon price.  The carbon price of 
$18/tonne for Ontario is modelled through a 10% increase in wholesale electricity price to be 
used as a proxy for industrial electricity prices and were regressed on exports (for production) 
and GDP (for consumption) while controlling for other economic factors.   
Variables 
In the production and consumption models, a consistent set of variables were used in most cases 
in formulating a demand model for various EITE sectors.  The impacts of exports and 
consumption as dependent variables were modelled separately as a function of increased 
industrial electricity prices and other economic factors.   
Within each sector that was assessed, the explanatory variables included manufacturing level 
multifactor productivity levels, industry specific GDP or the value of manufacturing in the 
industry as a proxy for demand and production.  The expected sign on these variables were to be 
positive.  In the production model, the impact of positive demand estimated through GDP (as an 
explanatory variable) could result in higher exports (dependent variable).  In the consumption 
model, the impact of positive demand modelled through multifactor productivity levels (as an 
explanatory variable) could result in higher domestic consumption of goods. 
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In some cases, the US-CAD exchange rate was included as an explanatory variable for certain 
industries that were particularly trade exposed.  A negative relationship is expected as a lower 
Canadian dollar can increase exports and trade competitiveness.  
The electricity price was increased by 10% as a proxy to capture the increasing costs of inputs 
with carbon pricing.  A negative relationship is expected as higher electricity prices can result in 
reduced competitiveness of exports and domestic consumption.   
The percentages below show the elasticities from the regressions, as the dependent variable and 
electricity prices were in logs.  Through this modelling exercise using Ontario data, it confirms 
industry findings that the leakage risk is small to date with relatively low carbon prices. 
Estimated Competitiveness Effects for Ontario, Net Production as Proxy for Production 
Leakage.   
 
 
Source:  author calculations using data noted in Table 4 of this report 
 
  
89 
 
Appendix 5:  Market Power of Canadian Industries (2010) 
 
 
Source:  The robustness of international benchmarks of competition intensity: the case of mark-ups, Working 
Paper 2008-10 (Crépeau and Peter, 2008) 
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Appendix 6:  Climate Change Action Plan Initiatives 
 
Source:  Ontario’s Climate Change Action Plan, 2016  
No. Action Cost of GGRA Funding
% of total proceeds
(max. estimate)
Estimated GHG 
Reduction in 2020
Cost of reduction 
($/tonne)
Action area 1 Increase availability and use of lower-carbon fuel $115-175 million 2% 2 million tonnes $20/tonne
Action area 2 Increase the use of electric vehicles $247-277 million 3% 50,000 tonnes $75/tonne
Action area 3 Support cycling and walking $150-225 million 3%
Reductions occur post-
2020
$500/tonne
Action area 4 Increase use of low-carbon trucks and buses $215-290 million 3% 400,000 tonnes $100/tonne
Action area 5
Support accelerated construction of GO Regional 
Express Rail
$355-675 million 8%
Reductions occur post-
2020
$525/tonne
Action area 6
Improve energy efficiency in multi-tenant residential 
buildings
$680-900 million 11% 99,000 tonnes $425/tonne
Action area 7 Improve energy efficiency in schools and hospitals $400-800 million 10% 113,000 tonnes $270/tonne
Action area 8 Reduce emissions from heritage buildings $40-80 million 1%
Reductions occur post-
2020
n/a
Action area 9 Help homeowners reduce carbon footprint $681-824 million 10% 180,000 tonnes $225/tonne
Action area 10 Set lower-carbon standards for new buildings n/a n/a n/a n/a
Action area 11 Promote low-carbon energy supply and products $60-100 million 1% 1 million tonnes $5/tonne
Action area 12 Help consumers manage energy use and save money $200-250 million 3%
Reductions to occur in 
building sector
n/a
Action area 13 Training, workforce and technical capacity $45-70 million 1%
Reductions to occur in 
building sector
n/a
Action area 14
Strengthen climate change policies in the municipal 
land-use planning process
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Action area 15 Support municipal and stakeholder climate action $270-325 million 4% 100,000 tonnes $165/tonne
Action area 16
Reduce congestion and improve economic 
productivity
$10-20 million 0% n/a n/a
Action area 17 Help industries adopt low-carbon technologies $875-1,100 million 13% 2.5 million tonnes $30/tonne
Action area 18 Help agri-food sector adopt low-carbon technologies $50-115 million 1% 150,000 tonnes $60/tonne
Action area 19 Collaboration activities $85-96 million 1% n/a n/a
Action area 20
Support innovation and commercialization of new 
low-carbon technologies
$140-235 million 3%
Reductions occur post-
2020
$75/tonne
Action area 21 Set tax and regulatory policy to encourage innovation Up to $1 milllion 0%
Reductions to occur in 
all sectors
n/a
Action area 22
Support research and development through Global 
Centre for Low-Carbon Mobility
$100-140 million 2%
Reductions to occur in 
transportation
n/a
Action area 23 Reduce emissions and energy costs $165-175 million 2% 200,000 tonnes $70/tonne
Action area 24 Reduce emissions from waste $20-30 million 0% 40,000 tonnes $50/tonne
Action area 25
Increasing understanding of how agricultural and 
natural lands emit and store carbon
$2-3 million 0%
Supports 
sequestration
n/a
Action area 26 Maximize carbon storage from agriculture $30 million 0%
Supports 
sequestration
n/a
Action area 27
Understand and enhance carbon storage in natural 
systems
$0.5-1.5 million 0%
Supports 
sequestration
n/a
Action area 28
Update Environmental Assessments to account for 
climate change
n/a n/a
Supports reductions in 
sectors where EA 
applies
n/a
$5.96-8.30 billion 9,832,000 tonnes
Government
Agriculture, Forests and Lands
Total investments 
Transportation Sector
Buildings and Homes
Land Use Planning 
Industry and Business
Collaboration with Indigenous Communities
Research and Development
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Appendix 7:  Auction Results for Joint Cap and Trade Program in Quebec and California 
(2012 to Present) 
 
Sources:  Results aggregated from California Air Resources Board, 2016; Quebec Ministry of Sustainable 
Development, Environment and the Fight against Climate Change  
Fiscal Year Auction Results
Quebec
(CDN$)
California
(US$)
Current Vintage
Settlement Price (average) $12.48
Total Purchases 64,438,402
Future Vintage
Settlement Price (average) $10.63
Total Purchases 27,091,000
Total Allowances Purchased 91,529,402
Total Proceeds (weighted by auction period) $1,072,036,704
Holding Limit /participant
5,945,000 (4% of total 
allowances)
Current Vintage
Settlement Price (average) $11.23 $11.49
Total Purchases 3,803,111 75,573,344
Future Vintage
Settlement Price (average) $11.23 $11.29
Total Purchases 5,750,000 29,326,000
Total Allowances Purchased 9,553,111 104,899,344
Total Proceeds (weighted by auction period) $107,060,814 $1,199,003,232
Holding Limit /participant
2,455,000 (11% of 
total allowances)
5,867,500 (4% of total 
allowances)
Current Vintage - Joint Auction
Settlement Price (average) $15.06 $12.28
Total Purchases 36,510,731 247,042,502
Future Vintage - Joint Auction
Settlement Price (average) $14.83 $12.09
Total Purchases 5,861,463 41,462,000
Total Allowances Purchased 42,372,194 288,504,502
Total Proceeds (weighted by auction period) $650,259,016 $3,543,956,393
Holding Limit /participant
Current Vintage - Joint Auction
Settlement Price (average) $17.32 $12.73
Total Purchases 22,321,365 143,139,008
Future Vintage - Joint Auction
Settlement Price (average) $16.89 $12.69
Total Purchases 2,794,037 19,792,500
Total Allowances Purchased 25,115,402 162,931,508
Total Proceeds (weighted by auction period) $434,156,630 $2,073,283,577
Holding Limit /participant
Total Proceeds - To Date  $           1,191,476,460  $                7,888,279,905 
Nov. 2015 - Aug. 2016 
(results up to Feb. 2016)
n/aNov. 2012- Aug. 2013
Nov. 2013 - Aug. 2014
Nov. 2014 - Aug. 2015
13,370,000 (3% of total allowances)
13,014,750 (3% of total allowances)
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Appendix 8:  Pooling of Allowances and Banking Provision, Linking with Ontario 
 
Sources:  Quebec and California Cap Regulations for the determination of caps and holding limit formula 
* potential timeframe for Ontario to link with Quebec and California 
  
Year Quebec
QC Market 
Share
 California 
CA Market 
Share
Ontario
ON Market 
Share
Allowance 
Budget from 
Linking
 Holding 
(banking) 
limit 
% of banked 
allowances 
of total
2014       23,200,000         159,700,000  n/a         182,900,000         6,447,500 4%
2015       65,300,000         394,500,000  n/a         459,800,000       13,370,000 3%
2016       63,190,000         382,400,000  n/a         445,590,000       13,014,750 3%
2017       61,080,000         370,400,000      142,332,000         431,480,000       12,662,000 3%
2018*       58,960,000         358,300,000      136,440,000         553,700,000       15,717,500 4%
2019*       56,850,000         346,300,000      130,556,000         533,706,000       15,217,650 4%
2020*       54,740,000         334,200,000      124,668,000         513,608,000       14,715,200 4%
 2018-2020    170,550,000 11%     1,038,800,000 65%      391,664,000 24%     1,601,014,000 
11% 65% 24%
14% 86% n/a
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Appendix 9:  Ontario’s EITE Sector Risk Ranking 
 
 
Source:  (Sawyer et al., 2016)  Note:  The risk ratings were developed by the MOECC with support from 
EnviroEconomics 
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Appendix 10:  California’s Industry Assistance Factors from 2013-2020 
 
Source:  California cap and trade regulation, sub-article 8  
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Appendix 11:  General Guidance for Practitioners on Climate Change Considerations in 
Environmental Assessments 
 
 
Source:   (Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 2016) 
 
